When I first started working at the University of Minnesota over ten years ago, just when the WWW as we know it today was starting up, I found that Teh U had an interesting set of rules that were so crazy that it made me volunteer to be on the committees that made IT related rules so I could end the insanity. The insanity continued, of course. I remember asking the appropriate unit, at the time I was creating my first U-related web site, about the rule that said “If you link to an outside site you are responsible for whatever happens on that site.” Does this mean, I inquired, that if I am walking by a bank and glance at it while it is being robbed, that I’m a felon?

It too over six months for the appropriate unit to respond to my memo (which had about 20 questions on it). The answer was inadequate. But I digress.

Peter Van Buren, author of We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People has a blog, and on his blog he linked to a WikiLeaks disclosed item. Therefore, apparently, he is a bad person and must be fired.

As summarized by Wired:

Van Buren said he was under investigation for allegedly disclosing classified information — even though he had merely linked to documents that were already widely available on the internet. The cable was just one in a cache of more than 250,000 State Department cables that WikiLeaks allegedly obtained from former Army intelligence analyst Bradley Manning last year and has been posting piecemeal online with media partners in the U.S. and Europe since last November.

“In other words, a link to a document posted by who-knows-who on a public website available at this moment to anyone in the world was the legal equivalent of me stealing a Top Secret report, hiding it under my coat, and passing it to a Chinese spy in a dark alley,” Van Buren wrote this week.

I have no opinion of Van Buren or his work, but you can follow the links above to open more than one can of worms. Or can of something. Enjoy.

Yemen Cables

NPR news is reporting on two cables that some claim could “embolden Al-Qaida.” I’m going to assume (there I go again) that the decreasingly venerable NPR has thrown the phrase “embolden Al-Qaida” into the headline to increase revenues, and try to rephrase the question more accurately: Will two cables regarding Yemen have a net positive or negative effects on a) US international diplomacy; b) US relations in the middle east esp. vis-a-vis Yemen and related countries and c) Al-Qaida’s political position on the Arabian Peninsula vis-a-vis the current standing government in the eyes of the inhabitants of the region or other relevant parties?

In fact, we will focus mainly on the third issue, which is the core of the proposition made in the NPR piece, but the other two are to be kept in mind.

For a bit of context, though this should be obvious, Al-Qaida would like to replace the Yemeni government, currently supported by the US and several other moderate or non-Islamic countries, with itself. Also, a widespread criticism of the current government is that it is not all that Islamic (Shariah), and that it is corrupt. Both are true, and this is widely known but simultaneously unacknowledged, as is usually the case with these things.

There are two cables.

Cable 1: This describes a meeting between General David Petraeus and Yemen’s president Ali Abdullah Saleh. The US had just launched two predator drone strikes on local Al-Qaida types, in which co-lateral deaths had occurred. The Yemeni government had previously agreed to claim that such “bombs” are their own, provided by the US government but launched by the Yemeni. I assume (?) that this would allow the acts to be seen less as the activities of the evil Western crusader, strengthen the perception of bellicosity of the Yemeni regime (useful in tribal negotiations, I assume they assumed) yet allow for deniablity when a fragment of the weapon is found stamped “Made in Taiwan” (which would indicate a US weapon).

In the cable it is confirmed (discussed) that the ‘bombs’ are US owned and US fired, but that the Yemeni government will “… continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours…” The cable records one of President Saleh’s aides interrupting with a joke about how Saleh is lying to his own parliament about the air strikes.

As recorded in the NPR article, experts feel that this will not be a surprise to most people within the “inner circle” because it is known that the government of Yemen is corrupt and the relationship between the US and Yemen is either known or assumed. However, spreading this conformation of the relationship and the corruption to the tribal region could hotten up the collars of the local leaders up and down the country’s wadis. It would be an Al-Qaida recruiting tool.

Is this a valid complaint? Unlike the real mythbusters, we can’t test this idea at this time using any laboratory or even logical methods. However, I would suggest that the claim that this would be a recruiting tool is valid, but that the value of the recruiting tool is limited. It depends on what else is going on. This could be more of an “It’s the economy, stupid” situation than anything else, meaning you can talk about philosophy and policy all you want, what is really important is [fill in the blank with the current on the ground important issue].

If the tribal leaders are content to walk the line between being friendly with al-Qaida and the government at the same time, this is not going to move them. If they or their people feel inclined to move more in one direction or another, this cable could be accordingly ignored or used as a focal point. This cable is probably icing on the cake. That means, if you like cake, it’s not important, but if you like icing, it is.

What is the positive side of this particular leak? I was struck at the blatant use of misinformation and denial. This seems to be the key “diplomatic” strategy exposed in this case. I suppose I don’t have a problem with disinformation as a tool in some case, but for years, since the early Reagan administration, disinformation has been one of the major bludgeons with which US diplomats have shaped (hammer-like) Mideast policy. For instance, it is likely that many terrorist events facilitated and/or paid for by leaders or operatives based east of the Suez were blamed (by the Reagan administration) on Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi, in part because it is easy to pin crazy terrorist activities on a crazy-looking guy, in part to move blame away from critically important underground allies such as Syria, and in part because Gaddafi was entirely out of the oil business as far as US interests were concerned, because he decided that Libya would not be an Oil-Barron state.

I strongly suspect that misinformation has been misused, and overused, as a tool. This cable exemplifies a case of it. I don’t think this cable demonstrates why misinformed is bad, so I don’t think this cable will lead to pressure to reduce the use of that strategy, but it may play a role in identifying it as a problem and ultimately reducing its use.

Cable 2: This cable records a conversation between President Saleh and US counter-terrorism chief, John Brennan, regarding smuggling across the Djibouti border. In the conversation about smuggling of drugs and weapons, whiskey is brought up, and the President jokes about how the illegal whiskey traffic is fine with him as long as it is good whiskey. In theory, this would upset strict adherents to Shariah law, and as noted above the claim that the government is insufficiently Islamic (as in Shariah) is a tool in the al-Qaida toolkit and a source of discontent.

The Yemeni leader’s disdain for Shariah law may be relevant in some cases, but as with the first cable, the degree to which it matters that Yemen is run by a whiskey-drinking faker may be vary with context. However, I’m going to call this myth busted at least for the near to medium future, until things change a great deal in Yemen.

Yemen is a collection of small tribal units that are sufficiently disdainful of the overarching government that the religiosity of that government is not especially important. Moreover, key tribal leaders in the Yemeni countryside probably gain significant political and social power because of their own high religious status, and having a state that is not especially holy may enhance their positions. A strict Shariah overlord would be a disadvantage to them.

Among the tribal units there are tribes that specifically watch over key religious sites, or that control pilgrimage routes between such sites. It is strict Islamic law that the pilgrimage should not be interfered with, and that pilgrims need to be cared for, helped along their way, and so on. As a result, certain factors become important: a) the presence of multiple very important pilgrimage sites in the Yemen interior and b) the complications that arise when neighbors may be in a Hobbsian state of “warre” (not necessarily fighting at any given moment but on the edge of unfriendliness, feudal style) in a system where all people, regardless of who is an ally of whom, must be allowed free passage.

As a result of this, the tribes exist in a complex hierarchy of shared responsibility and differential religiosity. Also, the social and political tools to allow enemies to put aside their differences for pragmatic reasons are very much in place and used on a daily basis. The idea that a central government, which has almost nothing to do with anything that ever happens on a day to day basis, has a low level of religiosity is probably unimportant or a mild advantage to the Wadi-based tribal leaders, as long as that government plays its expected role (mediating between hostage takers and oil companies, for instance). In fact, given the link between religion and place in Yemen, since the “government” is an entity unfixed to a holy place or a pilgrimage, or to any historically important religious figure to begin with, it is probably not expected to be especially Shariah. As long as the government does not locally interfere with Shariah, then who cares what it does?

It is probably worth mentioning something about the geography of Yemen. Yemen is a long narrow country with a long coast line. Several roughly parallel large wadis extend from the coast into a raised arid plateau, bifurcating into a network of smaller wadis as they rise into the interior. When rain falls, much of it ends up draining down the wadis, and for thousands of years a system of small dams and canals has gathered and captured this rain for use in limited local agriculture and for keeping stock. Most of the “tribal” people in the region live up and down these wadis, along which are the aforementioned sacred sites. Meanwhile, over the centuries, there has been varying degrees of trade, via cities at the openings of the wadis along the coast, with the outside world. The trade between villages up the wadi and other points in the Middle East, the coast of Africa, and points east in the Indian Ocean has historically been more important than what is going on, say, two or three wadi’s away. Possibly connected to this, and certainly important, is the fact that as various external forces have exerted control over this part of the Saudi peninsula, local groups have generally resisted or ignored this control. (I’m basing much of this on the material written by Yemen Scholar Lynn Newton.)

If you read the NPR article, there is at least one unnoticed but important irony. It is noted that the talk about President Saleh’s un-Shariah interest in Whiskey will get around because Yemeni men have a daily afternoon ritual of Khat chewing.

“The fact that every day, there is a built-in block of hours during khat chews for people to get together and talk and discuss, means this message will get out there,” Boucek said. “I am sure this will be the essential part of discussions for khat chews for the coming weeks.”

So, let’s sit around and chew the narcotic substance while we complain about somebody who sits around drinking a narcotic substance. I am not surprised that the Irony is lost on Western pundits and reporters, but I’m guessing it will not be lost on the Yemeni Khat chewers, and that irony will likely temper their negative attitude abut Saleh’s drink.

Summary:

Myth 1: Exposure of lies about US use of missiles in Yemen will strengthen Al-Qaida. Unconfirmed. The blithe US use of disinformation, which has been a major problem in US-Mideast relations since George Schultz decided it should be our number one policy tool, may become less popular, which will be a good thing. The use of this information as a recruiting tool is highly questionable.

Myth 2: Saleh’s whiskey drinking habits will annoy Yemeni people and turn them against the government. Busted. The tribal Yemeni were already well aware of their own religious purity relative to others, including the government, and in fact, this is an important source of their political power.

Apologies to Mythbusters.

“I’m glad you guys could come over for dinner,” said our host, as we shared the task of moving dishes and serving plates, silverware and glasses from the dining room table to the kitchen.

“Get out of here, no need to help cleaning up,” he continued, shooing the three of us away from the kitchen and into the living room, where we distributed ourselves on various pieces of furniture.

I had known Bill years ago in school, and we only recently got in touch via, you guessed it, Facebook. Bill and I had a mutual friend, as it turns out, Patti, and Patti’s friend, Angela and I ended up over a Bill’s for a bit of catching up and to meet his wife, Marge. The dinner conversation had been mostly a matter of re-orientation and catching up, but as was clear from the nature of the original invite, there was another reason to get together. Bill was interested in talking politics, and in particular, trying to recruit some help in one of his latest activist ventures.

“We’ll do the dishes later,” Marge noted as she and Bill joined us in the living room. We were all well fed, the baby was in bed, the dog let out in the yard and back in again (a couple of times) and the cat was content and asleep on the window sill. There wasn’t much more to do but to talk.

And the conversation did develop quickly. Bill outlined his recent interests in Native American rights, and got us up to speed on an upcoming internal government conference between BIA folks from Washington and their local counterparts, State DNR and Minnesota Department of State officials, and some county representatives regarding future plans for land use in and near one of the larger reservations up north.

The meeting was important, and it would be held without a single representative from the Native American community. This was the feds and the state planning how to “handle” the Indians in what would be a contentious fight over land use. Bill quickly got to the point: He was a member of a group who intended to disrupt, and thus call attention to, the meeting, using a combination of legal and illegal means. None of the illegal means were meant to be especially violent or harmful, but there would be smoke bombs and a car fire (of a recently commandeered clunker, and the fire would be very controlled … something about a “res car” on fire as a symbol of repression).

It was certainly interesting to hear the discussion and planning of an actual radical event. It had been years since I had ever been involved in anything like that. Actually, other than storming the State Capitol a couple of times … those were always unplanned, impromptu events at major anti-war demonstrations … I had only been involved in the planning of an actual illegal protest once. A group of us formed a “cell” to discuss, and not necessarily enact, illegal actions against those who were regularly attacking abortion clinics in the Boston area. We would have done things like letting all the air out of the tires of their cars while they were in church in the early AM before clinic attacks, or perhaps using impromptu road blocks to stop one or more of their buses from making it to the clinic on time.

Our intention in forming our secret cell was to discuss the possibility of doing this and make a decision as to whether or not to go on with our plans. So we did … we discussed it, at length, at a meeting in Harvard Square one balmy August night, sitting in plain sight and looking like nothing other than a bunch of hippies hanging around with nothing better to do.

Our meeting broke up after we decided to not carry out any such acts against the anti-choice protesters. We decided that it would be counterproductive if what we would do worked, and doubly counterproductive if it didn’t. As the meeting broke up, six newly recruited marines, drunk as skunks, sauntered into the square and started to beat up homeless people. So, in a moment of poignant irony, we walked around the corner to where we knew the police would be stationed, “keeping an eye on things,” told them about the out of control Marines, and then we dispersed never to meet again.

And here I was decades later in a room with Bill, Marge, Angela and Patti, discussing the possibility of lighting a car on fire to disrupt a meeting of state and federal officials.

“We’ll park the car in the ramp next to the Federal Office Building in Saint Paul one day before, and wipe it down. The smoke bomb and a small Molotov Cocktail will be in the car already, but we’ll light it by hand on the day of the meeting.”

Interesting. Simple is good, makes it hard for anything to go wrong.

“Marge got a job with the catering service handling the luncheon for the conference.”

Wow, an inside job!

“She’ll arrange to get me, and a few others, into the meeting. We’ll be dressed in Native American garb, and we’ll read a proclamation we’ve written that takes land away from the whites and puts them on a reservation, turns downtown Saint Paul over to the tribes, restricts white hunting rights, yada yada,” Bill was saying. “A parody, if you will, of the US treaties and policies against Indians.”

Could make good press, I thought, if the press picks it up.

“And we’ll pour red-colored water all over the papers in their meeting room, to symbolize the blood that all the treaties have been written in.”

A bit of a cliche, I thought, but whatever …

Bill had a number of other details, including their escape plan. None of the operatives wanted to get caught, there was no plan for jailed radicals, hunger strikes, any of that. Just make a big mess and get the hell out of Dodge.

The conversation went on for a while, and although I could tell by subtle eye contact with Patti and Angela that they thought the whole thing was a bit crazy and had no intention of volunteering to help. Then we talked about other things … a bit more catching up, some more of politics distant in time and space, and eventually, Wikileaks came up.

“That is so cool,” Bill was saying. “Releasing years and years of all the emails between the US embassies and the state department. It will take years to process all that dirty laundry!” He was almost giddy.

“Yeah,” I said. “A lot of interesting stuff there. But I don’t think Wikileaks should have just released everything, you know?”

“Why not?” replied Bill, giving me a funny look.

“Yeah. For instance, remember me telling you years ago about catching those missionaries who were looting archaeological sites?”

“Oh, yeah, I remember that.”

“Well, that involved communications between the US State Department and Embassies in two countries. If I knew at the time that those communications were not private, I’m not so sure I would have been so quick to be, essentially, an FBI informer.”

That got his attention. I don’t think Bill, who fully enjoyed the fact that the missionaries had gotten nabbed at the border, really ever thought of me as an FBI informer. Mainly because I’m not. Except that one time.

“Also, remember when we arranged to have people investigate that Mass Grave in Central Africa?”

“Oh yeah, cool! Applied anthropology with a political vengeance!” Bill replied, nostalgically.

“Well, those communications are probably in that wikileaks package now,” I said. “They’ll be overlooked because they are not important now, all small time stuff, but at the time, very private conversations were being held. I remember one email, cc’ed to all parties, in which an FBI agent … the one who was helping us … made a fairly strong political remark that I appreciated but that would probably have gotten him assigned to a post in Nome, Alaska.”

Bill stared at me, not quite getting it. Then he blurted out, “This whole thing about lives being in danger … that has been disproved.”

“Maybe. But you’ve got to admit, that there are times when people have private conversations that really should not be released to the public just because they exist.”

“No such thing,” Bill replied, quickly, and rather thoughtlessly. “Openness is the best policy, no matter what. There may be a few embarrassing moments, but for the most part, more openness is always good. Wikileaks is only doing what everybody else should do.”

Angela quickly jumped in, seeing the conversation getting uncomfortably heated, and changed the topic to the latest play at the Bedlam, her favorite anarchist hangout. And, for my part, I was happy to see the subject dropped. Bill and I had similar overall political interests, but very different ways to approach them, and in this case, a vastly different view of what constituted ‘freedom of information.’ I had a sense that our freedoms, even as government workers or, more importantly, private citizens who are communicating about sensitive issues to government workers, included freedom to speak freely without fear of international publication of our words meant to be heard in private. I even thought that Wikileaks had no choice but to release all of what they had once they had it, but that the people who had stolen the files had done something abysmally wrong.

Finally, the conversation wound down, and unlike the old days when we may have filled up on coffee, or something, to keep going until dawn, yawning goodbyes were being said, when Bill asked, “So, are you interested. In helping with the protest?”

“I’ll let you know,” I replied.

“Sorry to push, but I’ll need to know soon,” he urged.

“You’ll know tomorrow. So will everyone else.”

A questioning look.

“I feel strongly that this conversation needs to be on my blog. Where everyone can read it. Check it tomorrow AM, Bill.”

PS: Bill, sorry, I can’t help you out with this one.

PPS: The preceding story was ENTIRELY MADE UP. There was no conversation about a radical protest at the “federal office building” in Saint Paul. The only part of this conversation that is even remotely real is this: A bunch of newly recruited Marines did indeed show up late one night in Harvard Square, attacking homeless people (and others). The rest if fiction. Oh, and Wikileaks really did release all that information. Bonus points if you can identify the theme of the names used in this story.