Comments on: Newly Released Hiroshima Photographs

By: JM

JM — Fri, 16 May 2008 12:46:00 +0000

Art. (| May 14, 2008 1:03 AM)There is so much wrong with your comment, I barely know where to start.”we used two different designs because we lacked the materials to make two of the same type.”Hogwash, they were alternative technologies. There was enough capacity to research and build two alternative designs. Both were successful, both were used.”We used the bombs as an alternative to a bloody invasion of an island whose leaders had sometimes advocated that the Japanese would literally fight to the last citizen”Sometimes? No frequently. The war party in Japan had often said that.But the fact is that both the war faction and the “peace” faction were agreed that Japan’s capacity to fight was finished. What they were fighting over were conditions. After Potsdam, the three main Allied powers – USA, UK and Soviet Union – had agreed on unconditional surrender. The Japanese knew this, but the war party – the majority – were holding out for conditional preservation of the imperial family and the structure of the Japanese state. The peace faction wanted to preserve the Japanese homeland. Promising the second class citizens of Okinawa full participation in Japanese society to encourage them to fight to the death (which they did) was one – thoughrally barbaric – thing. Risking the sanctity of the home islands another.And guess what? MacArthur, as American Viceroy, gave the war party exactly what they wanted – preservation of the Japanese nation (they still fly the Rising Sun you know) but only after they had unconditionally surrendered. That he did that as a piece of pragmatic politics is neither here nor there. The war was close to an end and would have happened very soon without the bombs.The war party were finished. They had just sent their flagship out as a sort of sea-going kamikazi vessel to see it sunk, large parts of their remaining fleet had been sunk or damaged in raids. They were even running out of kamikazi, the US Navy could have shown up in Tokyo Bay and started shelling the palace like Commodore Perry if they really wanted to.The only discussion in Japan was “sue for peace with conditions and preserve the Empire” vs “give up”And then you have this rot: “The reality was that the US was pretty much spent. When we dropped the bomb on Nagasaki we had effectively disarmed our entire nuclear force. We only had two bombs. “Disarmed? How? How do you disarm something that never existed? Yes, there were only two bombs, but that’s not the question. Your point is completely moot, are you saying the weapons were ineffective and a subsequent invasion was necessary? An invasion of a spent nation, acheived by simply showing up and watching while the Japanese put their hands in the air because they had nothing left to fight with? Which is exactly what happened anyway?As for being spent, the entire Pacific war was largely fought with only the Marines – who were not a large force. MacArthur had relatively light casualties, compared to those in Europe. And then the entire Army, a much larger force – who’d been pretty much uninvolved in the Pacific – had suddenly become available after the end of the war in Europe.”We were still strong, compared to all other nations”Japan perhaps? If the US was “off the bloom”, Japan was stiffed, in the coffin and just waiting for the last few nails.”But it would have been unimaginably costly.”Rubbish. See above, and compare with the Emperer’s statement of surrender. He says that he is unwilling to see the Japanese people suffer anymore, or to allow them to be overrun by gaigen (means ‘barbarian’) hordes.”Are two such attacks, neither as costly in lives as the numbers lost in the fire bombing of Tokyo,”You contradict yourself. Either the nuclear attacks – which killed fewer people than months of fire bombing – were so utterly terrifying that they compelled surrender, or they were simply the icing on the cake. Two words. Kurile Islands. Also see “Treaty of San Francisco, 1951″The Soviet Union invaded the islands at the end of the war and their continued incursion would have caused a partition of Japan like in Europe. The use of the of nuclear weapons was purely a geopolitical action to demonstrate superior power to the Soviet Union, with the Japanese as guini pigs.It had nothing to do with the ahistorical mythology you have absorbed.That is, unless you regard Truman as a war criminal, because there is no moral case to be made for the use of the bomb, only one based in real politick.

By: uncle noel

uncle noel — Fri, 16 May 2008 12:14:57 +0000

Tyler, you are claiming that Americans were morally obligated to behave differently than the Japanese; and, in effect, to care more about them than they cared about themselves (they knew hundreds of thousands could be killed even without an atomic bomb). You may be right, but you’re not going to get many people to agree with you. If bombing Hiroshima would end the war the day before your brother got killed, would you choose a different action? Well, someone’s brother would have been killed. Truman’s job was to protect Americans, not the Japanese. It’s not always clear where to draw the line between an “atrocity” and “justifiable action” in war. I think the discussion is useful, but it’s ultimately a matter of opinion, is it not?

By: Grant Canyon

Grant Canyon — Fri, 16 May 2008 12:07:36 +0000

“I don’t disagree. My position has always been that those who have the benefit of historical hindsight often overlook the fact that, in a war, atrocities are committed (war is an atrocity in itself, although sometimes an unavoidable one). My argument is against those who, in the spirit of Grant Canyon (presumably, unless I’m misreading him), deny that the bombing was an atrocity in the first place.”Oh, I don’t deny that they were atrocities. (Indeed, the bombings weren’t even the largest atrocity in the war from the Allied side. I think, in terms of sheer pain suffered, the Tokyo fire and Dresden bombing probably inflicted more pain, by virtue of the fact that many of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki died near instantly and suffered little, if at all, whereas deaths in Tokyo and Dresden involved suffocation, smoke inhalation and burning.) My position is not that “the bombings were not an atrocity,” but, rather, that it was the least bad choice (from the American perspective), given their strategic goals, political limitations/requirements, and available resources. It was one of those situations were there were only bad choices.”I’m not trying to eliminate Japanese culpability in their failure to recognize reality and surrender, but the specific course of action taken by the allies also renders them culpable. Furthermore, the fact that the allies had all the cards in part of my point. We had the overwhelming upper-hand and did not exhaust possible alternatives to massacring a large number of civilians before resorting to it. That is, at the very least, a huge moral failing on our part.”I understand that you aren’t trying to eliminate Japanese culpability, but I think that the fact that the Allies gave the Japanese a chance to end the war (albeit on terms not agreeable to the Japanese) without the bombings constituted all the Allies could reasonably have been expected to do, at that stage in the war. Had the Japanese made any public pronouncement other than that they would kill the Allies’ demand with silence and that they would continue to fight, then perhaps the onus would have been on the Allies to come up with a lesser demand. But the fact of the matter is that the Japanese didn’t express anything but contempt for the demand for surrender certainly lessens any moral obligation on the Allies to do more.”In terms of negotiation, we never even offered what was eventually accepted anyway: surrender terms that involved a guarantee that the Japanese could keep their Emperor, who we knew was an important figurehead and whose fate we knew was a huge factor in the course of action the Japanese took.”You keep saying “negotiation”… But the Japanese rejected the concept of negotiations. The Allies made their initial demands and the Japanese said, in essence, “screw you, we’re fighting to the bloody end.” Since they didn’t make any counter offer to our initial demand, there was no negotiation, so there was no reason for the Allies to make this concession. And it was not at all certain, before the occupation began, that we would not prosecute Hirohito for his crimes. The fact that MacArthur found him useful in governing Japan after the war was the only reason why he didn’t suffer the punishment he deserved.”It is certain that most of the populace and politicians shared such a position (with a modification, as I’m not saying that ‘any’ resolution would have been preferable, but that we should have attempted to reach a more favorable resolution before we decided to drop the bomb). I don’t have a reference handy, but I remember reading that contemporaneous polling indicated that anywhere between 10 and 15 percent of Americans found it proper that Japan be annihilated entirely.”There is a difference between total annihilation and unconditional surrender. The American population was tired of war and wanted to see the war end, for sure. But they wanted it ended with Allied victory, regardless of whether Japanese civilians suffered the cost. They believed that it was better that Japanese civilians suffer rather than the American and other Allied soldiers. That’s why the US population was overwhelmingly in favor of the atomic bombings. Indeed, about 1/4 of the population regretted that we did not use more of them.Most of the population would not have supported ending the war with something that was not the substantial equivalent of unconditional surrender. (I think the poll numbers were, like, 90-10, even if it required an invasion of the home islands.) The kind of surrender that the Japanese could have potentially agreed to prior to the bombings were not the result which the American people would have accepted.”But the revenge-mindedness, nationalism and racism of the polities and populations of other countries do not excuse atrocities for them, so they by extension do not excuse them for us.”Well, “revenge-mindedness”, “nationalism” and “racism” are three totally different things, not at all naturally lumped together. And, indeed, the first two are not even per se objectionable, like the last is, especially as it pertains to the policy of a nation as opposed to personal morality. And I disagree with your unspoken premise that “revenge-mindedness” and “nationalism” can never justify (which is, I believe, a better word than “excuse” in this context) atrocities like the atomic bombings. It may not make them morally correct, but they can certainly justify such actions, under certain circumstances. Truman and the Allies faced such circumstances.”And this is all irrelevant unless you take the position that Japanese civilians deserved the bombing because of the actions of their government and military, or even more bizarrely that ‘justice demanded’ that we reciprocate such atrocities.”Not that the Japanese civilians “deserved the bombings because of the actions of their government and military” but that the actions of their government and military destroyed any reasonable expectation or claim that the Japanese civilians could have had that the Allies would take the Japanese civilian’s interests into consideration in formulating their strategic and tactical decisions.It is the difference between gratuitously bombing, on the one hand (which is the equivalent of saying that the civilians “deserved” the bombing); not bombing out of moral considerations even though it would have advanced the strategic results (which is the equivalent of the course I assume you would have preferred); and bombing notwithstanding the moral considerations because it advanced the strategic results sought (which I’m saying is justified [even if it is not moral] in light of the Japanese atrocities.)”As for the issue of leniency itself, one could argue that we did ultimately show such anyway, as the Japanese were granted a concession that no other Axis powers were following surrender. Hirohito, an influential and important figurehead of the government that committed such atrocities, was not subject to any war-crimes tribunals and remained in a ceremonial position until 1989.”But that was not done out of any sense of leniency, but because it furthered the Allied occupation. It was a way of saying to the Japanese people “not only you, but Hirohito himself, were wrongly guided by the militarists. We will rebuild your society so that that can’t happen again.” But if it would have advanced the occupation aims to hang Hirohito, he would have hanged. It was not leniency as much as it was pragmatism.”For one thing, you’re insisting that the deaths of so many civilians was to be taken for granted anyway. While it is true that naval blockades or ground invasions probably would have resulted in more deaths overall, those were not the only options available.”But they were the only options which carried the potential to actually end the war on terms that the Allies were willing to accept, in light of the Japanese disdainful dismissal of Potsdam.”Did they offer a modified postdam with an unequivocal guarantee that the Emperor would not be subject to warcrimes tribunals? No.”Again, why would they have offered this? Japan expressed no interest in negotiations and expressed no willingness to surrender. There was also a believe among the Allies that Hirohito should hang for his crimes. Were the Allied expected to offer demand after demand, each time giving up more and more to the Japanese, until the Japanese got what they wanted?? Why in the world would the Allies do that? Where is it in their strategic interest to do so?”Did they drop the bomb in an uninhabited area and allow the Japanese to survey the damage, with the notice that we would go further if need be? No.”A lot of people bring this option up, but I am dumbfounded that people believe this course of events could have accomplished anything. First, where, exactly, would you have proposed the bomb to have been dropped? Any area that is sufficiently uninhabited to be an appropriate target probably is barren wilderness with insufficient infrastructure or materials (natural or man made) to generate enough “damage” to investigate. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were both air-burst weapons, and the damage primarily came from the heat generated by the explosion setting fire to the buildings and from the shock wave (pressure wave) which collapsed the infrastructure. (Indeed, portions of the base of the Trinity tower, which was only 60 feet tall, survived the test blast at Alamogordo.) Absent that infrastructure and materials, you would have had nothing but a bright light, a big bang and a bunch of scorched earth. Probably not enough to convince die-hard militarists to abandon their approach.Further, there is the down side risks. Any sufficiently useful test would require the Japanese to witness the event. That would entail risking the interception of the bomber or the recovery of the weapon if it failed to detonate. Though small risks, they were still significant.Moreover, it goes against the evidence to think that the mere examination of damage, itself, could convince the Japanese. At this point in the war, we had so thoroughly leveled Japanese cities that the bombers were running out of targets. Not military target, mind you, but strategic targets. Basically, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Niigata, Kokura, and Nagasaki stood, because they were set aside as potential targets for the atomic bomb. The country was literally little but damage. The Japanese did not need to go far to see the kind of damage the Allies could inflict, but that was not enough.Finally, there is the macabre fact that this “test” was actually performed, but not on a barren wilderness, but on the city of Hiroshima. By the end of that day, the Japanese knew what hit them, that it took a single bomber to deliver the weapon, that the destructive power was massive, and had “notice that we would go further if need be.” Even with that example, they did not surrender, and proceeded to fight on. Even after Nagasaki was destroyed, there was still those in the power structure who wanted to fight. If losing a city did not do the job, what makes you think that witnessing the bomb explode on the slope of Fuji-san would have done the trick??”Other feasible avenues were not exhausted and that makes the action of dropping the bomb unjustifiable.”Only if you believe that there is an exhaustion requirement. I don’t believe that the Allies had to exhaust every option, regardless of what that option was, prior to taking action which they believed was necessary to end the war and protect the Allied lives.

By: Tyler DiPietro

Tyler DiPietro — Thu, 15 May 2008 19:41:43 +0000

Noel,I don't disagree. My position has always been that those who have the benefit of historical hindsight often overlook the fact that, in a war, atrocities are committed (war is an atrocity in itself, although sometimes an unavoidable one). My argument is against those who, in the spirit of Grant Canyon (presumably, unless I'm misreading him), deny that the bombing was an atrocity in the first place.Continuing with Grant,"But why would the Allies negotiate against themselves? They had all the cards, and the only thing that kept the Japanese in the game, so to speak, was their unwillingness to give up. It may be "understandable" for them to refuse to do so, but it doesn't excuse their culpability in the matter."I'm not trying to eliminate Japanese culpability in their failure to recognize reality and surrender, but the specific course of action taken by the allies also renders them culpable. Furthermore, the fact that the allies had all the cards in part of my point. We had the overwhelming upper-hand and did not exhaust possible alternatives to massacring a large number of civilians before resorting to it. That is, at the very least, a huge moral failing on our part. In terms of negotiation, we never even offered what was eventually accepted anyway: surrender terms that involved a guarantee that the Japanese could keep their Emperor, who we knew was an important figurehead and whose fate we knew was a huge factor in the course of action the Japanese took."Further, your presumption is that any negotiated resolution would have been preferable to a fight until the complete capitulation of Japan. That presumption was not shared by the Allied populace or politicians, nor was it unreasonable to not share that presumption."It is certain that most of the populace and politicians shared such a position (with a modification, as I'm not saying that "any" resolution would have been preferable, but that we should have attempted to reach a more favorable resolution before we decided to drop the bomb). I don't have a reference handy, but I remember reading that contemporaneous polling indicated that anywhere between 10 and 15 percent of Americans found it proper that Japan be annihilated entirely. But the revenge-mindedness, nationalism and racism of the polities and populations of other countries do not excuse atrocities for them, so they by extension do not excuse them for us."They committed the most horrific of war crimes against soldiers and civilians all across Asia for years. And you expect that the Allies should have been lenient?? Justice demanded that Japan be shown no leniency."And this is all irrelevant unless you take the position that Japanese civilians deserved the bombing because of the actions of their government and military, or even more bizarrely that "justice demanded" that we reciprocate such atrocities. For reference, Osama bin Laden also takes that position with regard to his brutal attacks on American civilians on 9/11 and elsewhere. Common human decency dictates otherwise. As for the issue of leniency itself, one could argue that we did ultimately show such anyway, as the Japanese were granted a concession that no other Axis powers were following surrender. Hirohito, an influential and important figurehead of the government that committed such atrocities, was not subject to any war-crimes tribunals and remained in a ceremonial position until 1989."Further, the death of these 200,000 probably resulted in saving the lives of many more, both Japanese and Americans. And, even if their deaths saved the lives of, say, 5,000 American GIs, it is neither unreasonable nor immoral for the US population and its leaders to choose to save the lives of its own soldiers over the lives of its enemy."For one thing, you're insisting that the deaths of so many civilians was to be taken for granted anyway. While it is true that naval blockades or ground invasions probably would have resulted in more deaths overall, those were not the only options available. Did they offer a modified postdam with an unequivocal guarantee that the Emperor would not be subject to warcrimes tribunals? No. Did they drop the bomb in an uninhabited area and allow the Japanese to survey the damage, with the notice that we would go further if need be? No. Other feasible avenues were not exhausted and that makes the action of dropping the bomb unjustifiable.

By: Grant Canyon

Grant Canyon — Thu, 15 May 2008 17:46:57 +0000

“That is only to point out that a negotiation of more favorable terms to the Allies was not dead in the water, and that dropping the bombs was at least not an immediate necessity absent our demand for ‘unconditional surrender’.”But why would the Allies negotiate against themselves? They had all the cards, and the only thing that kept the Japanese in the game, so to speak, was their unwillingness to give up. It may be “understandable” for them to refuse to do so, but it doesn’t excuse their culpability in the matter.Further, your presumption is that any negotiated resolution would have been preferable to a fight until the complete capitulation of Japan. That presumption was not shared by the Allied populace or politicians, nor was it unreasonable to not share that presumption.”Could he have been nudged further in that direction had we been more lenient? Can’t know for sure, but remember that what hanged in the balance were the lives of 200,000 civilians.”But why would the Allies — circa 1945 — be lenient toward Japan at all?? This was a government which sneak-attacked without warning and fought, tortured, raped and murdered — as military policy — without mercy for years, instituted horrific occupations driven by a racist vision of Japanese superiority against not just non-Asians (which would have been bad enough), but against non-Japanese. They committed the most horrific of war crimes against soldiers and civilians all across Asia for years. And you expect that the Allies should have been lenient?? Justice demanded that Japan be shown no leniency.Your whole position puts the onus on the Allies to do everything in their power to avoid these casualties (who were not all civilians, by the way). That makes no sense. The Japanese knew that they could stop the killing of Japanese civilians at any moment simply by accepting the terms of Cairo and Potsdam. They chose not do so — and never signalled publically to the Allies and their own populace that they wanted to do so — until they were forced to by Hirohito, after facing the expected consequences of their actions.Further, the death of these 200,000 probably resulted in saving the lives of many more, both Japanese and Americans. And, even if their deaths saved the lives of, say, 5,000 American GIs, it is neither unreasonable nor immoral for the US population and its leaders to choose to save the lives of its own soldiers over the lives of its enemy.”Negotiation is typically a two-way street. America’s demand of unconditional surrender could only be seen as galvanizing the delusional elements of the Japanese military who still thought it worthwhile to continue to fight. Instead dismissing surrender terms out of hand, the allies could have offered a renegotiation.”But the Allies didn’t dismiss surrender terms out of hand, the Japanese did. They reacted to the Potsdam Declaration not by proposing a counter offer of surrender or begging for surrender terms or acknowledging defeat or even offering to open negotiations, but by public announcing that they would “kill it with silence,” which was a sign of contempt, and to boast that they would “do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war.”The fact is that these two sides had different strategic goals, and neither was willing to move until Nagasaki. If that didn’t happen, it would have been Olympic and Coronet, which probably would have killed many more people.

By: uncle noel

uncle noel — Thu, 15 May 2008 11:46:25 +0000

I think that our American History class gets to this discussion, but I’m not sure to what end. I did mention the debate to my students, but we didn’t spend much time on it and it seems like it wasn’t as important to them as to the commenters here and at the photo site. After all, this is ancient history to a 17 yr old.Tyler: I recently heard a historian say, “No Great Power behaves morally. No exceptions.” Your hindsight second guessing of the Bombing, seen in that light, is facile: those who would have made a different decision wouldn’t have been in position to make it. You are correct that a more moral option was probably available to the U.S. But concern for the welfare of those identified as the enemy is just not a priority in war. This is why war is bad. It is immoral. And the Japanese were just as responsible as the Americans for what happened.

By: Tyler DiPietro

Tyler DiPietro — Wed, 14 May 2008 18:42:04 +0000

"But the point was, that they were offering a negotiated peace whereby there would be no occupation, no foreign war crimes tribunals, no reconstitution of the Japanese polity and no foreign oversight of any disarmament. The question in that negotiation would be how much of the Japanese conquest they would be permitted to keep and other wholly external matters."There were divisions within Japan as to which surrender terms would eventually be offered. Imperial confidant Koichi Kido insisted upon approaching the Allies with many more concessions, including the disarmament of Japan's military with the exception of a minimal force for maintaining order. This was, IIRC, before they suffered defeat at Okinowa and had the Soviets abandon the neutrality pact. That is only to point out that a negotiation of more favorable terms to the Allies was not dead in the water, and that dropping the bombs was at least not an immediate necessity absent our demand for "unconditional surrender"."Because the one person who could command the entire nation to "endure the unendurable" and "accept the unacceptable" -- Hirohito -- directed them to do so."Judging by the fact that Hirohito authorized one of his top aids (Kido) to approach the supreme council with a proposal for more generous surrender terms, Hirohito was already leaning in such a direction in any case, and after Okinowa we know was pessimistic about Japan's ability to continue military conflict. Could he have been nudged further in that direction had we been more lenient? Can't know for sure, but remember that what hanged in the balance were the lives of 200,000 civilians."Not at all true. There were many who did not believe that a non-negotiated surrender, even as an alternative to annihilation, was something which they could accept.........Was there a "peace camp" who was looking to end the war at near any cost? Sure. And they won out at the end when Hirohito agreed with them. But they never offered an offer of peace that was reasonably acceptable to the Allies."Negotiation is typically a two-way street. America's demand of unconditional surrender could only be seen as galvanizing the delusional elements of the Japanese military who still thought it worthwhile to continue to fight. Instead dismissing surrender terms out of hand, the allies could have offered a renegotiation.

By: Grant Canyon

Grant Canyon — Wed, 14 May 2008 16:52:30 +0000

“Japan’s military was effectively slain, they had virtually no navy, airforce, oil, gas or other natural resources with which to reconstitute any kind of force. One would be hard pressed to find any feasible way the commanding officers would’ve been able to retain authority after surrender.”But the point was, that they were offering a negotiated peace whereby there would be no occupation, no foreign war crimes tribunals, no reconstitution of the Japanese polity and no foreign oversight of any disarmament. The question in that negotiation would be how much of the Japanese conquest they would be permitted to keep and other wholly external matters. They assuredly were not offering “Potsdam with special provisions for Hirohito.” (And their final acceptance was, in fact, an acceptance of “Potsdam with special provisions for Hirohito.” The Allies ignored the addendum, and considered it an unconditional surrender. As it turned out, they found Hirohito useful, so it was a useful fiction, at any rate; they got to claim unconditional surrender, and the Japanese got to claim the protection of the body of the Emperor, if not the protection of his office and his godhood.)”And without that, what remains is a ceremonial imperial post with Hirohito himself not being subject to war crimes trials after the conclusion of the war, both of which came to pass in the end anyway.”What would have occurred would have been the continuation of the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial powers and prerogatives inherent in that document. If anything, it is likely that if such a surrender as was being offered were accepted by the Allies, the Emperor would have been in an even stronger position, being perhaps the only national political leader would could command respect across the society and could have been a unifying force. (Which was what MacArthur used him for.)”You’re trying to have your cake and eat it too. If surrender was such a shame that they would fight even given that there was no point, then why did they surrender after the mere loss of only 200,000 people?”Because the one person who could command the entire nation to “endure the unendurable” and “accept the unacceptable” — Hirohito — directed them to do so. He decided that he did not wish to see the “honorable death of the hundred million” (i.e., the death of every Japanese man, woman and child), which was the only feasable alternative which he could see and which was on the table, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the entry of Russia into the war.”The Japanese brass were already well aware of the fact that they had lost the war, given that they had already offered surrender. ‘Fight to the last man’ may have been used as propaganda, but it was obviously not in close alignment with reality.”Not at all true. There were many who did not believe that a non-negotiated surrender, even as an alternative to annihilation, was something which they could accept. Even after Hirohito recorded the message to the Japanese people accepting the terms of surrender, the Hantanaka coup sought to take Hirohito into “protective custody”, destroy the recording, prevent the acceptance of the surrender and continue to fight on, in the belief that doing so would have been the Emperor’s “true” wish, if he was not “misled” by his advisors.Was there a “peace camp” who was looking to end the war at near any cost? Sure. And they won out at the end when Hirohito agreed with them. But they never offered an offer of peace that was reasonably acceptable to the Allies.”Also, regarding the comparisons to the ‘conditional’ surrender of Germany in the conclusion of WWI, the scenarios are not comparable for another reason.”Perhaps, but that doesn’t change the fact that the Allies, at the time, believed it to be a valid consideration and that belief motivated their decision making regarding the demand for unconditional surrender.

By: Tyler DiPietro

Tyler DiPietro — Wed, 14 May 2008 15:03:38 +0000

Also, regarding the comparisons to the "conditional" surrender of Germany in the conclusion of WWI, the scenarios are not comparable for another reason. The situation fell apart with the rise of Hitlerism for one reason and one reason only: the European powers lacked the capability the enforce the surrender terms when it came down to crunch time. America was in no comparable position, as it not only had a very capable military but an industrial infrastructure that went from world class to roided-up due to the immense demands of wartime production.

By: Tyler DiPietro

Tyler DiPietro — Wed, 14 May 2008 14:58:36 +0000

"But, more to the point, even under the Japanese "surrender offers," most of these same militarists believed that they would continue to rule Japan under the same system. "Retention of the Emperor" actually entailed "retention of the imperial system" -- the same system under which Japan started the wars against China, US, etc."Japan's military was effectively slain, they had virtually no navy, airforce, oil, gas or other natural resources with which to reconstitute any kind of force. One would be hard pressed to find any feasible way the commanding officers would've been able to retain authority after surrender. And without that, what remains is a ceremonial imperial post with Hirohito himself not being subject to war crimes trials after the conclusion of the war, both of which came to pass in the end anyway."Surrender was shame to them, so they would fight to the death, even when there was no point to doing so."You're trying to have your cake and eat it too. If surrender was such a shame that they would fight even given that there was no point, then why did they surrender after the mere loss of only 200,000 people? The Japanese brass were already well aware of the fact that they had lost the war, given that they had already offered surrender. "Fight to the last man" may have been used as propaganda, but it was obviously not in close alignment with reality."That is true; the Japanese knew what they, themselves, did to other peoples when they were in the superior position. However, upon their surrender, they were not treated by the Americans, as in the manner in which they, themselves, had acted against, for example, the Chinese."I'm not denying the Japanese war crimes during WWII, just FYI.