George Musser provides an interesting discussion on one aspect of the “global warming debate,” specifically, the role of the term “Scientific Consensus.”

To scientists, “consensus” really means two things (in my opinion): 1) A preponderance of evidence indicates a certain view, and 2) given an immediate need to make a decision based on this view, one feels comfortable proceeding. These are not meant to be either mutually exclusive (they overlap a great deal) or exhaustive (there is more to “consensus” than this).

Musser points out another aspect of “scientific consensus” which is the way the public (outside of the science community) views it:

…the invocations of consensus are seen, by scientists, as expressions of humility. Yet the general public sees them as expressions of arrogance. To the man in the street, all the talk about scientific consensus sounds like: “Trust us, folks. Don’t worry your pretty little heads about it. Just think what we tell you to think.”

…

The term “scientific consensus” … sounds like asking people to take things on faith, which is contrary to the whole point of science. It also lets skeptical scientists claim they are… they are estranged from mainstream science for what they say, …

… Telling people that there is a consensus cannot substitute for explaining why there is a consensus. As much as climate scientists may be wearying of debate, they need to press onward and treat each question as though it was the first time they had ever heard it.

I tend to agree with Musser. (Though I don’t think it is productive or accurate to say that climate scientists are weary of debate … scientists thrive on debate with other scientists, and debate is very much alive in the climate science world … though what the debate is about shifts. But yes, climate scientists may well be tired of the sterile political maneuvering!)

But yes, he has a good point, perhaps, that “scientific consensus” is a term that has a downside.

I suggest simply shifting the phraseology to what consensus is based on. Use the term preponderance of evidence. And put the needed equivocation within the object of the sentence rather than the predicate.

For instance, “The preponderance of evidence seems to tell us that the term “scientific consensus” has a down side” is good but not good enough.

Better to say: “The preponderance of evidence tells us that the term “scientific consensus” may have a down side.” Almost there.

But “may” means nothing in particular, and if there is in fact a preponderance of evidence then go ahead and suggest a stronger level of acceptance, reflecting #2 in my definition above:

“The preponderance of evidence tells us that the term ’scientific consensus’ likely has a downside.”

I’m not sure if Musser is right. The issue is still open to debate….