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appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in Moscow offering "confidential information" from "the Prosecutor General of Russia" about "interactions between certain political forces in our two countries."<sup>683</sup>

Shortly after his June 3 call with Emin Agalarov, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr.<sup>684</sup> The email stated:

#### Good morning

Emin just called and asked me to contact you with something very interesting.

The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this morning and in their meeting offered to provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father. This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump - helped along by Aras and Emin.

What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Emin about it directly? I can also send this info to your father via Rhona, but it is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first.

Best

**Rob Goldstone** 

Within minutes of this email, Trump Jr. responded, emailing back: "Thanks Rob I appreciate that. I am on the road at the moment but perhaps I just speak to Emin first. Seems we have some time and if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next week when I am back?"<sup>685</sup> Goldstone conveyed Trump Jr.'s interest to Emin Agalarov, emailing that Trump Jr. "wants to speak personally on the issue."<sup>686</sup>

On June 6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstone if there was "[a]ny news," and Goldstone explained that Trump Jr. was likely still traveling for the "final elections . . . where [T]rump will be 'crowned' the official nominee."<sup>687</sup> On the same day, Goldstone again emailed Trump Jr. and asked when Trump Jr. was "free to talk with Emin about this Hillary info."<sup>688</sup> Trump Jr. asked if

<sup>685</sup> DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet; RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone).

<sup>6</sup> Grand Jury RG000062 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone & Trump Jr.).

<sup>687</sup> RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A. Agalarov to Goldstone); RG000064 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to A. Agalarov).

<sup>688</sup> RG000065 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>683</sup> See Gribbin 8/31/17 302, at 1-2 & 1A (undated one-page document given to congressional delegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with broad national responsibilities in the Russian legal system. See Federal Law on the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation (1992, amended 2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>684</sup> RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Donald Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet.

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they could "speak now," and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov.<sup>689</sup> On June 6 and June 7, Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had multiple brief calls.<sup>690</sup>

Also on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a meeting in New York with the Trump Organization.<sup>691</sup> Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized U.S. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras Agalarov.<sup>692</sup> Kaveladze told the Office that, in a second phone call on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis for the meeting and Veselnitskaya's business card. According to Kaveladze, Aras Agalarov said the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kaveladze to translate.<sup>693</sup>

## ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign

On June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. and said that "Emin asked that I schedule a meeting with you and [t]he Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow."<sup>694</sup> Trump Jr. replied that Manafort (identified as the "campaign boss"), Jared Kushner, and Trump Jr. would likely attend.<sup>695</sup> Goldstone was surprised to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner would attend.<sup>696</sup> Kaveladze **Grand Jury** "puzzled" by the list of attendees and that he checked with one of Emin Agalarov's assistants, Roman Beniaminov, who said that the purpose of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey "negative information on Hillary Clinton."<sup>697</sup> Beniaminov, however, stated that he did not recall having known or said that.<sup>698</sup>

Early on June 8, 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3:00 p.m.

<sup>698</sup> Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>689</sup> DJTJR00445 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone and Trump Jr.); RG000065-67 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone and Trump Jr.); Grand Jury 690 DJTJR00499 (Call Records of Donald Trump Jr. Grand Jury ); Call Records of Donald Trump Jr. Grand Jury <sup>691</sup> Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6; Grand Jur 692 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 1-2; Gran Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 2-3; Grand Jury <sup>693</sup> Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6. <sup>694</sup> DJTJR00467 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet: RG000068 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Grand Jury <sup>695</sup> DJTJR00469 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet; RG000071 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); OSC-KAV 00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); Grand Jury <sup>696</sup> Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 7; Grand Jury 697 see Kaveladze 11/16/17 302 at 7; OSC-KAV\_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze).

meeting the following day with Trump Jr.<sup>699</sup> Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under the subject line "FW: Russia - Clinton – private and confidential," adding a note that the "[m]eeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices."<sup>700</sup> Kushner then sent his assistant a second email, informing her that the "[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now."<sup>701</sup> Manafort responded, "See you then. P."<sup>702</sup>

Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about the Clinton Foundation.<sup>703</sup> Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend.<sup>704</sup> Gates recalled that the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late, Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful.<sup>705</sup> Hicks denied any knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017,<sup>706</sup> and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9 meeting came up at all earlier that week.<sup>707</sup>

Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump's office on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr. told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward.<sup>708</sup> Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia.<sup>709</sup> From the tenor of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation.<sup>710</sup> In an interview with the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father about the

699 NOSC000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas).

<sup>700</sup> NOSC00000039-42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort); DJTJR00485 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort).

<sup>701</sup> NOSC0000004 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas).

<sup>702</sup> 6/8/16 Email, Manafort to Trump Jr.

<sup>703</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7; Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. Although the March 1 302 refers to "June 19," that is likely a typographical error; external emails indicate that a meeting with those participants occurred on June 6. *See* NOSC00023603 (6/6/16 Email, Gates to Trump Jr. et al.).

<sup>704</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. See Neil MacFarquhar, A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?, New York Times (July 16, 2017).

<sup>705</sup> Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4.

<sup>706</sup> Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6.

<sup>707</sup> Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 8.

<sup>708</sup> Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6.

<sup>709</sup> Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-5.

<sup>710</sup> Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 15-16.

emails or the upcoming meeting.<sup>711</sup> Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone informing candidate Trump of the meeting, including Trump Jr.<sup>712</sup> President Trump has stated to this Office, in written answers to questions, that he has "no recollection of learning at the time" that his son, Manafort, or "Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton."<sup>713</sup>

#### b. The Events of June 9, 2016

#### i. Arrangements for the Meeting

Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9, 2016, for appellate proceedings in the *Prevezon* civil forfeiture litigation.<sup>714</sup> That day, Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin, a Soviet-born U.S. lobbyist, **Grand Jury** and when she learned that he was in New York, invited him to lunch.<sup>715</sup> Akhmetshin told the Office that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky Act and had worked on the *Prevezon* litigation.<sup>716</sup> Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a

<sup>712</sup> Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 3-4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 10.

<sup>713</sup> Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I, Parts (a)-(c)). We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that candidate Trump had contemporaneous knowledge of the June 9 meeting. On June 7, 2016 Trump announced his intention to give "a major speech" "probably Monday of next week"—which would have been June 13—about "all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons." See, e.g., Phillip Bump, What we know about the Trump Tower meeting. Washington Post (Aug. 7, 2018). Following the June 9 meeting, Trump changed the subject of his planned speech to national security. But the Office did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting on June 12, could well have caused the change. The President's written answers to our questions state that the speech's focus was altered "[i]n light of' the Pulse nightclub shooting. See Written Responses, supra. As for the original topic of the June 13 speech, Trump has said that "he expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negative information about the Clintons," and that the draft of the speech prepared by Campaign staff "was based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information from the book Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer." Written Responses, supra. In a later June 22 speech, Trump did speak extensively about allegations that Clinton was corrupt, drawing from the Clinton Cash book. See Full Transcript: Donald Trump NYC Speech on Stakes of the Election, politico.com (June 22, 2016).

<sup>714</sup> Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017) at 41, 42; Alison Frankel, *How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into U.S. for Trump Tower Meeting?* Reuters, (Nov. 6, 2017); Michael Kranish et al., *Russian Lawyer who Met with Trump Jr. Has Long History Fighting Sanctions*, Washington Post (July 11, 2017); *see OSC-KAV00113 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze)*; RG000073 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Lieberman 12/13/17 302, at 5; *see also Prevezon Holdings* Order (Oct. 17, 2016).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>711</sup> Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 28-29, 84, 94-95 (Sept. 7, 2017). The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not under oath, but Trump Jr. was advised that it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation. *Id.* at 10-11.

<sup>715</sup> Grand Jury

Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitskaya with Magnitsky-related lobbying and the *Prevezon* case, also attended the lunch.<sup>717</sup> **Grand Jury** Veselnitskaya said she was meeting **Grand Jury** and asked Akhmetshin what she should tell him.<sup>718</sup> According to several participants in the lunch, Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging financial misconduct by Bill Browder and the Ziff brothers (Americans with business in Russia), and those individuals subsequently making political donations to the DNC.<sup>719</sup> **Grand Jury** 

The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting.<sup>721</sup>

ii. Conduct of the Meeting

Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side, while Kaveladze, Samochornov, Akhmetshin, and Goldstone attended with Veselnitskaya.<sup>722</sup> The Office spoke to every participant except Veselnitskaya and Trump Jr., the latter of whom declined to be voluntarily interviewed by the Office **Grand Jury** 

The meeting lasted approximately 20 minutes.<sup>723</sup> Grand Jury

<sup>24</sup> Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselnitskaya to begin but did not say anything about the subject of the meeting.<sup>725</sup> Participants agreed that Veselnitskaya stated that the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton Campaign.<sup>726</sup> She asserted that the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering

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302, at 2, 4; Grand Jury	L
<sup>718</sup> Grand Jury	
<ul> <li><sup>719</sup>Grand Jury</li> <li>Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 7; Grand</li> <li>Samochornov did not recall to subject matter of the Trump Tower meeting coming up at lunch.</li> <li>Grand Jury</li> <li>Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. In her later Senate statement and interactions with Veselnitskaya produced what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9</li> </ul>	the planned the press,
<sup>720</sup> Grand Jury	
<sup>721</sup> E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4.	
<sup>722</sup> E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4.	
<sup>723</sup> E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 9.	
<sup>724</sup> Grand Jury	
<sup>725</sup> Grand Jury	
726 Grand Jury	1. 1. 2.

in both the United States and Russia,<sup>727</sup> Grand Jury <sup>728</sup> According to Akhmetshin, Trump Jr. asked follow-up

questions about how the alleged payments could be tied specifically to the Clinton Campaign, but Veselnitskaya indicated that she could not trace the money once it entered the United States.<sup>729</sup> Kaveladze similarly recalled that Trump Jr. asked what they have on Clinton, and Kushner became aggravated and asked "[w]hat are we doing here?"<sup>730</sup>

Akhmetshin then spoke about U.S. sanctions imposed under the Magnitsky Act and Russia's response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian children.<sup>731</sup> Several participants recalled that Trump Jr. commented that Trump is a private citizen, and there was nothing they could do at that time.<sup>732</sup> Trump Jr. also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in government.<sup>733</sup> Notes that Manafort took on his phone reflect the general flow of the conversation, although not all of its details.<sup>734</sup>

At some point in the meeting, Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating "waste of time," followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that



7/13/17 302, at 3. Trump Jr. confirmed this in a statement he made in July 2017 after news of the June 2016 meeting broke. *Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee U.S. Senate Washington DC*, 115th Cong. 57 (Sept. 7, 2017).

<sup>734</sup> Manafort's notes state:

Bill browder
Offshore - Cyprus
133m shares
Companies
Not invest - loan
Value in Cyprus as inter
Illici
Active sponsors of RNC
Browder hired Joanna Glover
Tied into Cheney
Russian adoption by American familie

PJM-SJC-00000001-02 (Notes Produced to Senate Judiciary Committee).

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they call him to give him an excuse to leave.<sup>735</sup> Samochornov recalled that Kushner departed the meeting before it concluded; Veselnitskaya recalled the same when interviewed by the press in July 2017.<sup>736</sup>

Veselnitskaya's press interviews and written statements to Congress differ materially from other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview, Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection to the Russian government and had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the Clinton Campaign when she met with Trump Campaign officials.<sup>737</sup> Veselnitskaya's November 2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June 9 meeting was not to connect with "the Trump Campaign" but rather to have "a private meeting with Donald Trump Jr.—a friend of my good acquaintance's son on the matter of assisting me or my colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress."<sup>738</sup> In other words, Veselnitskaya claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign. No witness, however, recalled any reference to Congress during the meeting. Veselnitskaya also maintained that she "attended the meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv," the previously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, but she did not "introduce [her]self in this capacity."<sup>739</sup>

In a July 2017 television interview, Trump Jr. stated that while he had no way to gauge the reliability, credibility, or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting, if "someone has information on our opponent . . . maybe this is something. I should hear them out."<sup>740</sup> Trump Jr. further stated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he should "listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say."<sup>741</sup> Depending on what, if any, information was provided, Trump Jr. stated he could then "consult with counsel to make an informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration."<sup>742</sup>

<sup>737</sup> Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr. Info on Clinton, NBC News (July 11, 2017).

<sup>738</sup> Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 115<sup>th</sup> Cong. 10 (Nov 20, 2017).

<sup>739</sup> Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 115<sup>th</sup> Cong. 21 (Nov. 20, 2017).

<sup>740</sup> Sean Hannity, Transcript-Donald Trump Jr, Fox News (July 11, 2017).

<sup>741</sup> Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16 (Sept. 7, 2017).

<sup>742</sup> Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16-17 (Sept. 7, 2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>735</sup> NOSC00003992 (6/9/16 Text Message, Kushner to Manafort); Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 9; Vargas 4/4/18 302, at 7; NOSC00000044 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas); NOSC00000045 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Cain).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>736</sup> Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Grand Jury Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 9-10; see also Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 48-49 (Sept. 7, 2017).

After the June 9 meeting concluded, Goldstone apologized to Trump Jr.<sup>743</sup> According to Goldstone, he told Trump Jr. Grand Jury <sup>744</sup> and told Emin Agalarov in a phone call that the meeting was about adoption Grand <sup>745</sup> Grand Jury <sup>46</sup> Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze to report in after the meeting, but before Kaveladze could call, Aras Agalarov called him.<sup>747</sup> With Veselnitskaya next to him, Kaveladze reported that the meeting had gone well, but he later told Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a waste of time because it was

#### c. Post-June 9 Events

not with lawyers and they were "preaching to the wrong crowd."748

Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarov made at least two unsuccessful attempts after the election to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder and the Magnitsky Act.<sup>749</sup> On November 23, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstone about setting up another meeting "with T people" and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed on June 9.<sup>750</sup> Kaveladze followed up with Goldstone, stating that "Mr. A," which Goldstone understood to mean Aras Agalarov, called to ask about the meeting.<sup>751</sup> Goldstone emailed the document to Rhona Graff, saying that "Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team. If needed, a lawyer representing the case is

<sup>743</sup> Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Grand Jury Goldstone 2/8/18 302,
at 9; Grand Jury
744 Grand Jury
<sup>745</sup> Grand Jury The week after the June 9 meeting, a cybersecurity firm
and the DNC announced the Russian hack of the DNC. <i>See</i> Volume I, Section III.B.2, <i>supra</i> . Grand Jury
(and one text message shows) that, shortly after the DNC
announcement, Goldstone made comments connecting the DNC hacking announcement to the June 9 meeting. Grand Jury OSC-KAV_00029 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E.
Agalarov & Kaveladze (10:09 a.m.)). The investigation did not identify evidence connecting the events of June 9 to the GRU's hack-and-dump operation. OSC-KAV_00029-30 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E.
Agalarov).
<sup>746</sup> Grand Jury
<sup>747</sup> Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze Grand Jury
<sup>748</sup> Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze Grand Jury
On June 14, 2016 Kaveladze's teenage daughter emailed asking how the June 9 meeting had gone, and Kaveladze responded, "meeting was boring. The Russians did not have any bad info on Hilary." OSC-
KAV_00257 (6/14/16 Email, I. Kaveladze to A. Kaveladze; Grand Jury
<sup>749</sup> Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 11; Grand Jury
<sup>750</sup> OSC-KAV_00138 (11/23/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); Grand Jury
<sup>751</sup> RG000196 (11/26-29/16 Text Messages, Goldstone & Kaveladze); Grand Jury

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in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team.<sup>752</sup> According to Goldstone, around January 2017, Kaveladze contacted him again to set up another meeting, but Goldstone did not make the request.<sup>753</sup> The investigation did not identify evidence of the transition team following up.

Participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting began receiving inquiries from attorneys representing the Trump Organization starting in approximately June 2017.<sup>754</sup> On approximately June 2, 2017, Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten, general counsel of the Trump Organization, about his participation in the June 9 meeting.<sup>755</sup> The same day, Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya's name to Garten, identifying her as the "woman who was the attorney who spoke at the meeting from Moscow."<sup>756</sup> Later in June 2017, Goldstone participated in a lengthier call with Garten and Alan Futerfas, outside counsel for the Trump Organization (and, subsequently, personal counsel for Trump Jr.).<sup>757</sup> On June 27, 2017, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject "Trump attorneys" and stated that he was "interviewed by attorneys" about the June 9 meeting who were "concerned because it links Don Jr. to officials from Russia—which he has always denied meeting."<sup>758</sup> Goldstone stressed that he "did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible meeting."<sup>759</sup> Emin Agalarov sent a screenshot of the message to Kaveladze.<sup>760</sup>

The June 9 meeting became public in July 2017. In a July 9, 2017 text message to Emin Agalarov, Goldstone wrote "I made sure I kept you and your father out of [t]his story,"<sup>761</sup> and "[i]f contacted I can do a dance and keep you out of it."<sup>762</sup> Goldstone added, "FBI now investigating," and "I hope this favor was worth for your dad—it could blow up."<sup>763</sup> On July 12, 2017 Emin Agalarov complained to Kaveladze that his father, Aras, "never listens" to him and that their



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relationship with "mr T has been thrown down the drain."<sup>764</sup> The next month, Goldstone commented to Emin Agalarov about the volume of publicity the June 9 meeting had generated, stating that his "reputation [was] basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father insisted on even though Ike and Me told him would be bad news and not to do."<sup>765</sup> Goldstone added, "I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father. So am painted as some mysterious link to Putin."<sup>766</sup>

After public reporting on the June 9 meeting began, representatives from the Trump Organization again reached out to participants. On July 10, 2017, Futerfas sent Goldstone an email with a proposed statement for Goldstone to issue, which read:

As the person who arranged the meeting, I can definitively state that the statements I have read by Donald Trump Jr. are 100% accurate. The meeting was a complete waste of time and Don was never told Ms. Veselnitskaya's name prior to the meeting. Ms. Veselnitskaya mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted 20 to 30 minutes at most. There was never any follow up and nothing ever came of the meeting.<sup>767</sup>

**Grand Jury** the statement drafted by Trump Organization representatives was **Grand Jury**<sup>768</sup> He proposed a different statement, asserting that he had been asked "by [his] client in Moscow – Emin Agalarov – to facilitate a meeting between a Russian attorney (Natalia Veselnitzkaya [sic]) and Donald Trump Jr. The lawyer had apparently stated that she had some information regarding funding to the DNC from Russia, which she believed Mr. Trump Jr. might find interesting."<sup>769</sup> Goldstone never released either statement.<sup>770</sup>

On the Russian end, there were also communications about what participants should say about the June 9 meeting. Specifically, the organization that hired Samochornov—an anti-Magnitsky Act group controlled by Veselnitskaya and the owner of Prevezon—offered to pay \$90,000 of Samochornov's legal fees.<sup>771</sup> At Veselnitskaya's request, the organization sent Samochornov a transcript of a Veselnitskaya press interview, and Samochornov understood that the organization would pay his legal fees only if he made statements consistent with Veselnitskaya's.<sup>772</sup> Samochornov declined, telling the Office that he did not want to perjure

<sup>764</sup> OSC-KAV_01197 (7/11-12/17 Text Messages, Kaveladze & E. Agalarov); Grand Jury
<sup>765</sup> Investigative Technique
<sup>766</sup> Investigative Technique
<sup>767</sup> 7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten.
<sup>768</sup> Grand Jury
<sup>769</sup> 7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten.
770 Grand Jury
<sup>771</sup> Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 1; Grand Jury
<sup>772</sup> Grand Jury Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 1.

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himself.<sup>773</sup> The individual who conveyed Veselnitskaya's request to Samochornov stated that he did not expressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya's answers but, in hindsight, recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of assistance to be conditioned on his not contradicting Veselnitskaya's account.<sup>774</sup>

Volume II, Section II.G, *infra*, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump Jr., and others in June and July 2017 regarding the June 9 meeting.

#### 6. Events at the Republican National Convention

Trump Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention. The evidence indicates that those interactions were brief and non-substantive. During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention, J.D. Gordon, a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposed amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing "lethal" assistance to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. Gordon requested that platform committee personnel revise the proposed amendment to state that only "appropriate" assistance be provided to Ukraine. The original sponsor of the "lethal" assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her (the sponsor) that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to dilute the language. Gordon denied making that statement to the sponsor, although he acknowledged it was possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter. The investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to or was directed by the candidate to make that proposal. Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed the proposed language was inconsistent with Trump's position on Ukraine.

## a. Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the Week of the RNC

In July 2016, Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy event, a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in Cleveland, Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention (RNC or "Convention").<sup>775</sup> Approximately 80 foreign ambassadors to the United States, including Kislyak, were invited to the conference.<sup>776</sup>

On July 20, 2016, Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at the conference.<sup>777</sup> In his speech, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the United States should have better relations with

<sup>773</sup> Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 1.

774 Grand Jury

<sup>775</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Allan Smith, We Now Know More About why Jeff Sessions and a Russian Ambassador Crossed Paths at the Republican Convention, Business Insider (Mar. 2, 2017).

<sup>776</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Laura DeMarco, *Global Cleveland and Sen. Bob Corker Welcome International Republican National Convention Guests*, Cleveland Plain Dealer (July 20, 2016).

<sup>777</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.

Russia.<sup>778</sup> During Sessions's speech, he took questions from the audience, one of which may have been asked by Kislyak.<sup>779</sup> When the speeches concluded, several ambassadors lined up to greet the speakers.<sup>780</sup> Gordon shook hands with Kislyak and reiterated that he had meant what he said in the speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations.<sup>781</sup> Sessions separately spoke with between six and 12 ambassadors, including Kislyak.<sup>782</sup> Although Sessions stated during interviews with the Office that he had no specific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak, he believed that the two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said some things about U.S.-Russia relations.<sup>783</sup>

Later that evening, Gordon attended a reception as part of the conference.<sup>784</sup> Gordon ran into Kislyak as the two prepared plates of food, and they decided to sit at the same table to eat.<sup>785</sup> They were joined at that table by the ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and by Trump Campaign advisor Carter Page.<sup>786</sup> As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for what Gordon estimated to have been three to five minutes, during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant what he said in his speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations.<sup>787</sup>

#### b. Change to Republican Party Platform

In preparation for the 2016 Convention, foreign policy advisors to the Trump Campaign, working with the Republican National Committee, reviewed the 2012 Convention's foreign policy platform to identify divergence between the earlier platform and candidate Trump's positions.<sup>788</sup> The Campaign team discussed toning down language from the 2012 platform that identified Russia as the country's number one threat, given the candidate's belief that there needed to be better U.S. relations with Russia.<sup>789</sup> The RNC Platform Committee sent the 2016 draft platform to the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee on July 10, 2016, the evening before its

778 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9.

779 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3.

<sup>780</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3.

<sup>781</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9.

<sup>782</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3; *see also* Volume I, Section IV.A.4.b, *supra* (explaining that Sessions and Kislyak may have met three months before this encounter during a reception held on April 26, 2016, at the Mayflower Hotel).

<sup>783</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.

<sup>784</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10.

<sup>785</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10.

<sup>786</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; *see also* Volume I, Section IV.A.3.d, *supra* (explaining that Page acknowledged meeting Kislyak at this event).

787 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.

788 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.

789 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.

first meeting to propose amendments.<sup>790</sup>

Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote on the platform, the Trump Campaign could request changes, and members of the Trump Campaign attended committee meetings.<sup>791</sup> John Mashburn, the Campaign's policy director, helped oversee the Campaign's involvement in the platform committee meetings.<sup>792</sup> He told the Office that he directed Campaign staff at the Convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach and only to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes.<sup>793</sup>

On July 11, 2016, delegate Diana Denman submitted a proposed platform amendment that included provision of armed support for Ukraine.<sup>794</sup> The amendment described Russia's "ongoing military aggression" in Ukraine and announced "support" for "maintaining (and, if warranted, increasing) sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully restored" and for "providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater coordination with NATO on defense planning."<sup>795</sup> Gordon reviewed the proposed platform changes, including Denman's.<sup>796</sup> Gordon stated that he flagged this amendment because of Trump's stated position on Ukraine, which Gordon personally heard the candidate say at the March 31 foreign policy meeting—namely, that the Europeans should take primary responsibility for any assistance to Ukraine, that there should be improved U.S.-Russia relations, and that he did not want to start World War III over that region.<sup>797</sup> Gordon told the Office that Trump's statements on the campaign trail following the March meeting underscored those positions to the point where Gordon felt obliged to object to the proposed platform change and seek its dilution.<sup>798</sup>

On July 11, 2016, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee, Denman offered her amendment.<sup>799</sup> Gordon and another Campaign staffer, Matt Miller, approached a committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendment to permit further discussion.<sup>800</sup> Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing "lethal

<sup>790</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1-2.

<sup>791</sup> Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 10.

<sup>792</sup> Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 7-8.

<sup>793</sup> Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.

<sup>794</sup> DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 1; Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2.

<sup>795</sup> DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22.

<sup>796</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10-11.

<sup>797</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11; Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 1-2, 5-6.

<sup>798</sup> Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 5-6.

<sup>799</sup> Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; see DENMAN 000014.

<sup>800</sup> Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2.

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defensive weapons to Ukraine."<sup>801</sup> Miller did not have any independent basis to believe that this language contradicted Trump's views and relied on Gordon's recollection of the candidate's views.<sup>802</sup>

According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they had to clear the language and that Gordon was "talking to New York."<sup>803</sup> Denman told others that she was asked by the two Trump Campaign staffers to strike "lethal defense weapons" from the proposal but that she refused.<sup>804</sup> Denman recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with candidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true.<sup>805</sup> Gordon denied having told Denman that he was on the phone with Trump, although he acknowledged it was possible that he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter.<sup>806</sup> Gordon's phone records reveal a call to Sessions's office in Washington that afternoon, but do not include calls directly to a number associated with Trump.<sup>807</sup> And according to the President's written answers to the Office's questions, he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the platform amendment.<sup>808</sup>

Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn, a senior foreign policy advisor, and Mashburn, the Campaign policy director. Gordon stated that he connected with both of them (he could not recall if by phone or in person) and apprised them of the language he took issue with in the proposed amendment. Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn and that all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation ("appropriate assistance").<sup>809</sup> Dearborn recalled Gordon warning them about the amendment, but not weighing in because Gordon was more familiar with the Campaign's foreign policy stance.<sup>810</sup> Mashburn stated that Gordon reached him, and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue and that the Campaign should not intervene.<sup>811</sup>

When the amendment came up again in the committee's proceedings, the subcommittee changed the amendment by striking the "lethal defense weapons" language and replacing it with

<sup>801</sup> Denman 6/7/17 302, at 3.

<sup>802</sup> M. Miller 10/25/17 302 at 3.

<sup>803</sup> Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2.

<sup>804</sup> Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2.

<sup>805</sup> Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2-3, 3-4; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2.

<sup>806</sup> Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7.

<sup>807</sup> Call Records of J.D. Gordon **Grand Jury**. Gordon stated to the Office that his calls with Sessions were unrelated to the platform change. Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7.

<sup>808</sup> Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part (f)).

<sup>809</sup> Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6-7; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11.

810 Dearborn 11/28/17 302, at 7-8.

<sup>811</sup> Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4.

"appropriate assistance."<sup>812</sup> Gordon stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately agreed to replace the language about armed assistance with "appropriate assistance."<sup>813</sup> The subcommittee accordingly approved Denman's amendment but with the term "appropriate assistance."<sup>814</sup> Gordon stated that, to his recollection, this was the only change sought by the Campaign.<sup>815</sup> Sam Clovis, the Campaign's national co-chair and chief policy advisor, stated he was surprised by the change and did not believe it was in line with Trump's stance.<sup>816</sup> Mashburn stated that when he saw the word "appropriate assistance," he believed that Gordon had violated Mashburn's directive not to intervene.<sup>817</sup>

#### 7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak

Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with Campaign officials with responsibility for the foreign-policy portfolio—among them Sessions and Gordon—in the weeks after the Convention. The Office did not identify evidence in those interactions of coordination between the Campaign and the Russian government.

# a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence

On August 3, 2016, an official from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States wrote to Gordon "[o]n behalf of" Ambassador Kislyak inviting Gordon "to have breakfast/tea with the Ambassador at his residence" in Washington, D.C. the following week.<sup>818</sup> Gordon responded five days later to decline the invitation. He wrote, "[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a constant stream of false media stories while also preparing for the first debate with HRC. Hope to take a raincheck for another time when things quiet down a bit. Please pass along my regards to the Ambassador."<sup>819</sup> The investigation did not identify evidence that Gordon made any other arrangements to meet (or met) with Kislyak after this email.

## b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak

Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions's Senate office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak.<sup>820</sup> At the time, Sessions was a member of the

812 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2-3; see Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2-3; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11.

- <sup>814</sup> Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2-3.
- 815 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6.
- 816 Clovis 10/3/17 302, at 10-11.
- <sup>817</sup> Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4.
- <sup>818</sup> DJTFP00004828 (8/3/16 Email, Pchelyakov [embassy@russianembassy.org] to Gordon).
- <sup>819</sup> DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to embassy@russianembassy.org).
- <sup>820</sup> Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>813</sup> Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 12.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meet with foreign officials in that capacity.<sup>821</sup> But Sessions's staff reported, and Sessions himself acknowledged, that meeting requests from ambassadors increased substantially in 2016, as Sessions assumed a prominent role in the Trump Campaign and his name was mentioned for potential cabinet-level positions in a future Trump Administration.<sup>822</sup>

On September 8, 2016, Sessions met with Kislyak in his Senate office.<sup>823</sup> Sessions said that he believed he was doing the Campaign a service by meeting with foreign ambassadors, including Kislyak.<sup>824</sup> He was accompanied in the meeting by at least two of his Senate staff: Sandra Luff, his legislative director; and Pete Landrum, who handled military affairs.<sup>825</sup> The meeting lasted less than 30 minutes.<sup>826</sup> Sessions voiced concerns about Russia's sale of a missile-defense system to Iran, Russian planes buzzing U.S. military assets in the Middle East, and Russian aggression in emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova.<sup>827</sup> Kislyak offered explanations on these issues and complained about NATO land forces in former Soviet-bloc countries that border Russia.<sup>828</sup> Landrum recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential campaign as "an interesting campaign,"<sup>829</sup> and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the Russian government was receptive to the overtures Trump had laid out during his campaign.<sup>830</sup> None of the attendees, though, remembered any discussion of Russian election interference or any request that Sessions convey information from the Russian government to the Trump Campaign.<sup>831</sup>

During the meeting, Kislyak invited Sessions to further discuss U.S.-Russia relations with him over a meal at the ambassador's residence.<sup>832</sup> Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak extended the invitation. After the meeting ended, Luff advised Sessions against accepting the one-on-one meeting with Kislyak, whom she assessed to be an "old school KGB guy."<sup>833</sup> Neither Luff nor Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or made any further effort to dine

821 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5.

822 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 3-5.

<sup>823</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.

<sup>824</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.

<sup>825</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5-6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5 (stating he could not remember if election was discussed).

<sup>826</sup> Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5.

827 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5.

<sup>828</sup> Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302 at 4-5.

<sup>829</sup> Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5.

<sup>830</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. Sessions also noted that ambassadors came to him for information about Trump and hoped he would pass along information to Trump. Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24.

<sup>831</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5.

<sup>832</sup> Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4.

833 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5.

or meet with Kislyak before the November 2016 election.<sup>834</sup> Sessions and Landrum recalled that, after the election, some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak.<sup>835</sup> According to Sessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak, two other ambassadors, and the Governor of Alabama.<sup>836</sup> Sessions, however, was in New York on the day of the anticipated meeting and was unable to attend.<sup>837</sup> The investigation did not identify evidence that the two men met at any point after their September 8 meeting.

#### 8. Paul Manafort

Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign, including a period as campaign chairman, from March to August 2016.<sup>838</sup> Manafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine. Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort's office in Kiev and who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence.

Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee,<sup>839</sup> to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign—including internal polling data, although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign.

<sup>836</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.

<sup>837</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.

<sup>838</sup> On August 21, 2018, Manafort was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on eight tax, Foreign Bank Account Registration (FBAR), and bank fraud charges. On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States (money laundering, tax fraud, FBAR, Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and (2) conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness tampering). Manafort also admitted criminal conduct with which he had been charged in the Eastern District of Virginia, but as to which the jury hung. The conduct at issue in both cases involved Manafort's work in Ukraine and the money he earned for that work, as well as crimes after the Ukraine work ended. On March 7, 2019, Manafort was sentenced to 47 months of imprisonment in the Virginia prosecution. On March 13, the district court in D.C. sentenced Manafort to a total term of 73 months: 60 months on the Count 1 conspiracy (with 30 of those months to run concurrent to the Virginia sentence), and 13 months on the Count 1 conspiracy, to be served consecutive to the other two sentences. The two sentences resulted in a total term of 90 months.

<sup>839</sup> As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.1.b, *supra*, Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in the District of Columbia, including making a false statement to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. He has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. *See also* Transcript at 16, *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr.*, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 514 ("*Manafort 2/13/19* Transcript") (court's explanation of reasons to credit Gates's statements in one instance).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>834</sup> Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>835</sup> Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.

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Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the United States during the campaign period and conveyed campaign information. The second meeting took place on August 2, 2016, in New York City. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who was then living in Russia. The message was about a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an email to Manafort expressing the view—which Manafort later said he shared—that the plan's success would require U.S. support to succeed: "all that is required to start the process is a very minor 'wink' (or slight push) from [Donald Trump]."<sup>840</sup> The email also stated that if Manafort were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his reception in Russia "at the very top level."

Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2: December 2016 (the Kilimnik email described above); January 2017; February 2017; and again in the spring of 2018. The Office reviewed numerous Manafort email and text communications, and asked President Trump about the plan in written questions.<sup>841</sup> The investigation did not uncover evidence of Manafort's passing along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or the Administration. The Office was not, however, able to gain access to all of Manafort's electronic communications (in some instances, messages were sent using encryption applications). And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new Administration about the peace plan, he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan and his meetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreement.<sup>842</sup>

The Office could not reliably determine Manafort's purpose in sharing internal polling data with Kilimnik during the campaign period. Manafort **Grand Jury** did not see a downside to sharing campaign information, and told Gates that his role in the Campaign would

<sup>840</sup> The email was drafted in Kilimnik's DMP email account (in English) Investigative Technique

<sup>841</sup> According to the President's written answers, he does not remember Manafort communicating to him any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 16-17 (Response to Question IV, Part (d)).

<sup>842</sup> Manafort made several false statements during debriefings. Based on that conduct, the Office determined that Manafort had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness. The judge presiding in Manafort's D.C. criminal case found by a preponderance of the evidence that Manafort intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the Office, and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues). Although the report refers at times to Manafort's statements, it does so only when those statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy, to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of evidentiary value, or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events, even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible.

be "good for business" and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed in the Ukraine. As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with him, Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a "disagreement"—a reference to one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafort's credibility and our limited ability to gather evidence on what happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik, the Office could not assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The Office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort's sharing polling data and Russia's interference in the election, which had already been reported by U.S. media outlets at the time of the August 2 meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise coordinated with the Russian government on its election-interference efforts.

#### a. Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine

Manafort's Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stem from his consulting work for Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate political consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015, including through his company DMP International LLC (DMI). Kilimnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018. Kilimnik, who speaks and writes Ukrainian and Russian, facilitated many of Manafort's communications with Deripaska and Ukrainian oligarchs.

#### *i.* Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work

In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with Vladimir Putin.<sup>843</sup> A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in 2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits that the work could confer on "the Putin Government."<sup>844</sup> Gates described the work Manafort did for Deripaska as "political risk insurance," and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests.<sup>845</sup> Manafort's company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and was loaned millions of dollars by Deripaska as well.<sup>846</sup>

In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners L.P. ("Pericles"), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe.<sup>847</sup> Deripaska was the sole investor.<sup>848</sup> Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led

<sup>843</sup> Pinchuk et al., Russian Tycoon Deripaska in Putin Delegation to China, Reuters (June 8, 2018).

<sup>846</sup> Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2-5; Manafort Income by Year, 2005 - 2015; Manafort Loans from Wire Transfers, 2005 - 2015.

<sup>847</sup> Gates 3/12/18 302, at 5.

<sup>848</sup> Manafort 12/16/15 Dep., at 157:8-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>844</sup> 6/23/05 Memo, Manafort & Davis to Deripaska & Rothchild.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>845</sup> Gates 2/2/18 302, at 7.

to a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska.<sup>849</sup> In particular, when the fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009, Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had "dried up."<sup>850</sup> According to Gates, various interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to resolve the legal dispute.<sup>851</sup> As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation.

#### *ii.* Political Consulting Work

Through Deripaska, Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov, a Ukrainian oligarch who hired Manafort as a political consultant.<sup>852</sup> In 2005, Akhmetov hired Manafort to engage in political work supporting the Party of Regions,<sup>853</sup> a political party in Ukraine that was generally understood to align with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power, and its candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a close and trusted political advisor to Yanukovych during his time as President of Ukraine. Yanukovych served in that role until 2014, when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests.<sup>854</sup>

#### iii. Konstantin Kilimnik

Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a longtime Manafort employee.<sup>855</sup> Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his senior entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients, including Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs.<sup>856</sup> Kilimnik also maintained a relationship with Deripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin,<sup>857</sup> a Russian national who previously served in the defense attaché office of the Russian Embassy to the United States.<sup>858</sup>

849 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9.

850 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 6.

<sup>851</sup> Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9-10.

<sup>852</sup> Manafort 7/30/14 302, at 1; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2.

853 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5-6.

<sup>854</sup> Gates 3/16/18 302, at 1; Davis 2/8/18 302, at 9; Devine 7/6/18 302, at 2-3.

<sup>855</sup> Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.

<sup>856</sup> Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8; Gates 1/31/18 302, at 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11.

<sup>857</sup> Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8.

858 Boyarkin Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.

Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian "spy."<sup>859</sup> The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence.<sup>860</sup> Several pieces of the Office's evidence—including witness interviews and emails obtained through court-authorized search warrants—support that assessment:

- Kilimnik was born on April 27, 1970, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, then of the Soviet Union, and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992.<sup>861</sup> Sam Patten, a business partner to Kilimnik,<sup>862</sup> stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian armament industry selling arms and military equipment.<sup>863</sup>
- U.S. government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997.<sup>864</sup>
- Kilimnik worked for the International Republican Institute's (IRI) Moscow office, where he did translation work and general office management from 1998 to 2005.<sup>865</sup> While another official recalled the incident differently,<sup>866</sup> one former associate of Kilimnik's at IRI told the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian intelligence were too strong. The same individual stated that it was well known at IRI that Kilimnik had links to the Russian government.<sup>867</sup>
- Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI Consulting, worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After Hawker's work for DMI ended, Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian

859 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5.

<sup>860</sup> The Office has noted Kilimnik's assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings. *E.g.*, Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr.*, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017), Doc. 73, at 2 ("*Manafort* (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify").

<sup>861</sup> 12/17/16 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.

<sup>862</sup> In August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the course of its investigation of Russian election interference. Plea Agreement, *United States v. W. Samuel Patten*, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 6; Statement of Offense, *United States v. W. Samuel Patten*, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 7.

<sup>863</sup> Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5-6.

<sup>864</sup> 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.

<sup>865</sup> Nix 3/30/18 302, at 1-2.

<sup>866</sup> Nix 3/30/18 302, at 2.

<sup>867</sup> Lenzi 1/30/18 302, at 2.

government entity on a public-relations project that would promote, in Western and Ukrainian media, Russia's position on its 2014 invasion of Crimea.<sup>868</sup>

• Gates suspected that Kilimnik was a "spy," a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker, and Alexander van der Zwaan,<sup>869</sup> an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>870</sup>

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## b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign

#### i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign

Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August 19, 2016. On March 29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign's "Convention Manager."<sup>871</sup> On May 19, 2016, Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief strategist, and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy campaign chairman.<sup>872</sup>

Thomas Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump.<sup>873</sup> In early 2016, at Manafort's request, Barrack suggested to Trump that Manafort join the Campaign to manage the Republican Convention.<sup>874</sup> Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately 1980 until the mid-1990s through various consulting and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trump in 1982 when Trump hired the Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly lobbying firm.<sup>875</sup> Over the years, Manafort saw Trump at political and social events in New York City and at Stone's wedding, and Trump requested VIP status at the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions worked by Manafort.<sup>876</sup>

<sup>868</sup> Hawker 1/9/18 302, at 13; 3/18/14 Email, Hawker & Tulukbaev.

<sup>869</sup> van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to making false statements to the Special Counsel's Office. Plea Agreement, *United States v. Alex van der Zwaan*, 1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2018), Doc. 8.

<sup>870</sup> Hawker 6/9/18 302, at 4; van der Zwaan 11/3/17 302, at 22. Manafort said in an interview that Gates had joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik's going to meet with his KGB handler. Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 7.

<sup>871</sup> Press Release – Donald J. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager Paul J. Manafort, The American Presidency Project – U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar. 29, 2016).

<sup>872</sup> Gates 1/29/18 302, at 8; Meghan Keneally, *Timeline of Manafort's role in the Trump Campaign*, ABC News (Oct. 20, 2017).

<sup>873</sup> Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 1-2; Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3.

<sup>874</sup> Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8.

<sup>875</sup> Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6.

<sup>876</sup> Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6.

According to Gates, in March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida to meet with Trump. Trump hired him at that time.<sup>877</sup> Manafort agreed to work on the Campaign without pay. Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time, but resuscitating his domestic political campaign career could be financially beneficial in the future. Gates reported that Manafort intended, if Trump won the Presidency, to remain outside the Administration and monetize his relationship with the Administration.<sup>878</sup>

#### ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts

Immediately upon joining the Campaign, Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Boris Kolesnikov,<sup>879</sup> the last three being Ukrainian oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc officials.<sup>880</sup> The memoranda described Manafort's appointment to the Trump Campaign and indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates emailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort's appointment to Kilimnik for translation and dissemination.<sup>881</sup> Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown "our friends" the media coverage of his new role.<sup>882</sup> Kilimnik replied, "Absolutely. Every article." Manafort further asked: "How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation seen?" Kilimnik wrote back the same day, "Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor [Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD."<sup>883</sup>

Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be "good for business" and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately \$2 million he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine.<sup>884</sup> Gates also explained to the Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help "confirm" that Deripaska had dropped the Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska (as

<sup>879</sup> Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11.

<sup>880</sup> See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort's Trial Isn't About Russia, but It Will Be in the Air, New York Times (July 30, 2018); Tierney Sneed, *Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made \$60 Million Consulting in Ukraine*, Talking Points Memo (July 30, 2018); Mykola Vorobiov, *How Pro-Russian Forces Will Take Revenge on Ukraine*, Atlantic Council (Sept. 23, 2018); Sergii Leshchenko, *Ukraine's Oligarchs Are Still Calling the Shots*, Foreign Policy (Aug. 14, 2014); Interfax-Ukraine, *Kolesnikov: Inevitability of Punishment Needed for Real Fight Against Smuggling in Ukraine*, Kyiv Post (June 23, 2018); Igor Kossov, *Kyiv Hotel Industry Makes Room for New Entrants*, Kyiv Post (Mar. 7, 2019); Markian Kuzmowycz, *How the Kremlin Can Win Ukraine's Elections, Atlantic Council* (Nov. 19, 2018). The Opposition Bloc is a Ukraine political party that largely reconstituted the Party of Regions.

<sup>881</sup> 3/30/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik.

<sup>882</sup> 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik.

<sup>883</sup> 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik.

<sup>884</sup> Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>877</sup> Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>878</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4.

discussed further below) so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against Manafort.<sup>885</sup> Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States, that Deripaska could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the Campaign or Administration might be helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort's relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other ways as well.<sup>886</sup> Gates stated, however, that Manafort never told him anything specific about what, if anything, Manafort might be offering Deripaska.<sup>887</sup>

Gates's account about polling data is consistent Grand Jury

with multiple emails that

Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts between late July and mid-August of 2016. Those emails referenced "internal polling," described the status of the Trump Campaign and

<sup>886</sup> Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12.

<sup>887</sup> Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12.

<sup>888</sup> Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2. In a later interview with the Office, Gates stated that Manafort directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May 7, 2016 meeting between Manafort and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.8.b.iii, *infra.* Gates 11/7/18 302, at 3.

<sup>889</sup> Gates 9/27/18 302, Part II, at 2; Grand Jury

<sup>890</sup> Gates 2/12/18 302, at 10; Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17.

<sup>891</sup> Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2; Gates 2/7/18 302, at 15.

<sup>892</sup> Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17.

<sup>893</sup> Gates 2/12/18 302, at 11-12. According to Gates, his access to internal polling data was more limited because Fabrizio was himself distanced from the Campaign at that point.

<sup>94</sup> Grand Jury

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>885</sup> Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2.

Manafort's role in it, and assessed Trump's prospects for victory.<sup>895</sup> Manafort did not acknowledge instructing Gates to send Kilimnik internal data, Grand Jury

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The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the purpose of the communications with Deripaska and that are consistent with Gates's account. For example, in response to a July 7, 2016, email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort's failed Deripaska-backed investment, Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on "this issue with our friend."<sup>897</sup> Gates stated that "our friend" likely referred to Deripaska,<sup>898</sup> and Manafort told the Office that the "issue" (and "our biggest interest," as stated below) was a solution to the Deripaska-Pericles issue.<sup>899</sup> Kilimnik replied:

I am carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest.

Our friend [Boyarkin] said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in his boss' [Deripaska's] mind, and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to you pretty soon, understanding all the time sensitivity. I am more than sure that it will be resolved and we will get back to the original relationship with V.'s boss [Deripaska].<sup>900</sup>

Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin's "boss," a reference to Deripaska, "that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate."<sup>901</sup> Manafort has alleged to the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an example: why Trump selected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential running mate.<sup>902</sup> Manafort said he never gave Deripaska a briefing.<sup>903</sup> Manafort noted that if Trump won, Deripaska would want to use Manafort to advance whatever interests Deripaska had in the United States and elsewhere.<sup>904</sup>

<sup>895</sup> 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Dirkse; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Schultz; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Marson; 7/27/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Jackson; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Mendoza-Wilson; 8/19/16 Email, Kilimnik to Patten.

<sup>96</sup> Grand Jury

898 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13.

<sup>899</sup> Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6.

<sup>900</sup> 7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort.

<sup>901</sup> 7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13.

<sup>902</sup> Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6.

903 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6.

<sup>904</sup> Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>897</sup> 7/7/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.

## *iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States*

Manafort twice met with Kilimnik in person during the campaign period—once in May and again in August 2016. The first meeting took place on May 7, 2016, in New York City.<sup>905</sup> In the days leading to the meeting, Kilimnik had been working to gather information about the political situation in Ukraine. That included information gleaned from a trip that former Party of Regions official Yuriy Boyko had recently taken to Moscow—a trip that likely included meetings between Boyko and high-ranking Russian officials.<sup>906</sup> Kilimnik then traveled to Washington, D.C. on or about May 5, 2016; while in Washington, Kilimnik had pre-arranged meetings with State Department employees.<sup>907</sup>

Late on the evening of May 6, Gates arranged for Kilimnik to take a 3:00 a.m. train to meet Manafort in New York for breakfast on May 7.<sup>908</sup> According to Manafort, during the meeting, he and Kilimnik talked about events in Ukraine, and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump Campaign, expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and elsewhere.<sup>909</sup> Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognized Manafort's position on the Campaign was an opportunity, but Kilimnik did not ask for anything.<sup>910</sup> Kilimnik spoke about a plan of Boyko to boost election participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which was the base for the Opposition Bloc.<sup>911</sup> Kilimnik returned to Washington, D.C. right after the meeting with Manafort.

Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New York City on the evening of August 2, 2016. The events leading to the meeting are as follows. On July 28, 2016, Kilimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow.<sup>912</sup> The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort requesting that they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day.<sup>913</sup> In an email with a subject line "Black Caviar," Kilimnik wrote:

I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. We spent about 5 hours talking about his story, and I have several important messages from him to you. He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation. I said I have to run it by you first, but in principle I am prepared to do it... It has to do about the future of his

#### <sup>905</sup>Investigative Technique

<sup>906</sup> 4/26/16 Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 6-7; Gates 11/7/18 302, at 3.

<sup>907</sup> 5/7/16 Email, Kilimnik to Charap & Kimmage; 5/7/16 Email, Kasanof to Kilimnik.

<sup>908</sup> 5/6/16 Email, Manafort to Gates; 5/6/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik.

<sup>909</sup> Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1.

<sup>910</sup> Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1.

911 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1.

912 7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to katrin@yana.kiev.ua (2:17:34 a.m.).

913 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.).

country, and is quite interesting.<sup>914</sup>

Manafort identified "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" as Yanukovych. He explained that, in 2010, he and Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent presidential election. Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar of black caviar that was worth approximately \$30,000 to \$40,000.<sup>915</sup> Manafort's identification of Yanukovych as "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow—where Yanukovych resided—when Kilimnik wrote "I met today with the guy," and with a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik referred to Yanukovych as "BG," Grand Jury <sup>916</sup> Manafort replied to Kilimnik's July 29 email, "Tuesday [August 2] is best . . . Tues or weds in NYC."<sup>917</sup>

Three days later, on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on that same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed "about 2 hours" for their meeting "because it is a long caviar story to tell."<sup>918</sup> Kilimnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August 2 at 7:30 p.m., and he and Manafort agreed to a late dinner that night.<sup>919</sup> Documentary evidence—including flight, phone, and hotel records, and the timing of text messages exchanged<sup>920</sup>—confirms the dinner took place as planned on August 2.<sup>921</sup>

As to the contents of the meeting itself, the accounts of Manafort and Gates—who arrived late to the dinner—differ in certain respects. But their versions of events, when assessed alongside available documentary evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten, indicate that at least three principal topics were discussed.

First, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region of Donbas,<sup>922</sup>

<sup>914</sup> 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.).

915 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 3.

<sup>916</sup> 7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik; Investigative Technique ; Gran

<sup>917</sup> 7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.

<sup>918</sup> 7/31/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.

<sup>919</sup> 7/31/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.

<sup>920</sup> Kilimnik 8/2/16 CBP Record; Call Records of Konstantin Kilimnik Grand Jur

**Call Records of Rick Gates Grand Jury**; 8/2-3/16, Kilimnik Park Lane Hotel Receipt.

<sup>921</sup> Deripaska's private plane also flew to Teterboro Airport in New Jersey on the evening of August 2, 2016. According to Customs and Border Protection records, the only passengers on the plane were Deripaska's wife, daughter, mother, and father-in-law, and separate records obtained by our Office confirm that Kilimnik flew on a commercial flight to New York.

<sup>922</sup> The Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, which are located in the Donbas region of Ukraine, declared themselves independent in response to the popular unrest in 2014 that removed President Yanukovych from power. Pro-Russian Ukrainian militia forces, with backing from the Russian military, have occupied the region since 2014. Under the Yanukovych-backed plan, Russia would assist in withdrawing the military, and Donbas would become an autonomous region within Ukraine with its own

and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic.<sup>923</sup> That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine.<sup>924</sup> Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off the discussion, Kilimnik would have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace plan, and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and Ukraine to support the plan.<sup>925</sup> Manafort also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik that the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall Kilimnik asking Manafort to reconsider the plan after their August 2 meeting.<sup>926</sup> Manafort said Grand Jury

that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending—years later—an "urgent" request when Yanukovych needed him.<sup>927</sup> When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafort acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan again in that email.<sup>928</sup> Manafort ultimately acknowledged Kilimnik also raised the peace plan in January and February 2017 meetings with Manafort, Grand Jury

Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's plan to win the election.<sup>930</sup> That briefing encompassed the Campaign's messaging and its internal polling data. According to Gates, it also included discussion of "battleground" states, which Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.<sup>931</sup> Manafort did not refer explicitly to "battleground" states in his telling of the August 2 discussion, **Grand Jury** 

prime minister. The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an ideal candidate to bring peace to the region as prime minister of the republic, and facilitate the reintegration of the region into Ukraine with the support of the U.S. and Russian presidents. As noted above, according to **GU** the written documentation describing the plan, for the plan to work, both U.S. and Russian support were necessary. **Grand Jury** 2/21/18 Email, Manafort, Ward, & Fabrizio, at 3-5.

<sup>923</sup> Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 4; Grand

- <sup>4</sup> Grand Jurv
- 925 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 4.
- <sup>926</sup> Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4.

Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/12/18

302, at 4.

<sup>928</sup> Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4; Investigative Technique

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<sup>929</sup> Grand Jury Documentary evidence confirms the peace-plan discussions in 2018. 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward (forwarding email from Manafort); 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio.

930 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5.

<sup>931</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 3, 5.

<sup>932</sup> Grand Jury

Third, according to Gates and what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed two sets of financial disputes related to Manafort's previous work in the region. Those consisted of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafort for his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment.<sup>933</sup>

After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both stated that they left separately from Kilimnik because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his connections to Kilimnik.<sup>934</sup>

#### c. Post-Resignation Activities

Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016, approximately two weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation, Manafort continued to offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election. Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate Trump,<sup>935</sup> and some of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. For example, on October 21, 2016, Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the Campaign make the case against Clinton "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment" and that "Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way – by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members."<sup>936</sup> Later, in a November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled "Securing the Victory," Manafort stated that he was "really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory," and that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by "mov[ing] immediately to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results."<sup>937</sup>

Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the Office that, in the wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an Administration job. Manafort instead preferred to stay on the "outside," and monetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.<sup>938</sup> Manafort appeared to follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entail.<sup>939</sup>

Manafort's activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and Russia. The

936 NOSC00021517-20 (10/21/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner).

937 NOSC00021573-75 (11/5/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner).

<sup>938</sup> Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1, 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4.

939 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1.

<sup>933</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2-4; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 7.

<sup>934</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>935</sup> Gates 2/12/18 302, at 12.

## Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)

first meeting, which took place in Madrid, Spain in January 2017, was with Georgiy Oganov. Oganov, who had previously worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States, was a senior executive at a Deripaska company and was believed to report directly to Deripaska.<sup>940</sup> Manafort initially denied attending the meeting. When he later acknowledged it, he claimed that the meeting had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit.<sup>941</sup> Other evidence, however, provides reason to doubt Manafort's statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the Pericles lawsuit. In particular, text messages to Manafort from a number associated with Kilimnik suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin—not Manafort's counsel—had arranged the meeting between Manafort and Oganov.<sup>942</sup> Kilimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be "not about money or Pericles" but instead "about recreating [the] old friendship"—ostensibly between Manafort and Deripaska—"and talking about global politics."<sup>943</sup> Manafort also replied by text that he "need[s] this finished before Jan. 20,"<sup>944</sup> which appears to be a reference to resolving Pericles before the inauguration.

On January 15, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid, Manafort emailed K.T. McFarland, who was at that time designated to be Deputy National Security Advisor and was formally appointed to that position on January 20, 2017.<sup>945</sup> Manafort's January 15 email to McFarland stated: "I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my travels over the last month."<sup>946</sup> Manafort told the Office that the email referred to an issue regarding Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine, and Manafort had traveled to Cuba in the past month.<sup>947</sup> Either way, McFarland—who was advised by Flynn not to respond to the Manafort inquiry—appears not to have responded to Manafort.<sup>948</sup>

Manafort told the Office that around the time of the Presidential Inauguration in January, he met with Kilimnik and Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Lyovochkin at the Westin Hotel in Alexandria, Virginia.<sup>949</sup> During this meeting, Kilimnik again discussed the Yanukovych peace plan that he had broached at the August 2 meeting and in a detailed December 8, 2016 message found in Kilimnik's DMP email account.<sup>950</sup> In that December 8 email, which Manafort

- <sup>945</sup> 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn.
- <sup>946</sup> 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn.

<sup>947</sup> Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7.

<sup>948</sup> 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18-19.

<sup>949</sup> Grand Jury Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7; Manafort 9/21/18 302, at 3; 1/19/17 & 1/22/17 Kilimnik CBP Records, Jan. 19 and 22, 2017; 2016-17 Text Messages, Kilimnik & Patten, at 1-2.

<sup>950</sup>Investigative Technique

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>940</sup> Kalashnikova 5/17/18 302, at 4; Gary Lee, Soviet Embassy's Identity Crisis, Washington Post (Dec. 20, 1991); Georgy S. Oganov Executive Profile & Biography, Bloomberg (Mar. 12, 2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>941</sup> Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>942</sup> Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>943</sup> Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik; Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>944</sup> Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik.

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acknowledged having read,<sup>951</sup> Kilimnik wrote, "[a]ll that is required to start the process is a very minor 'wink' (or slight push) from DT"—an apparent reference to President-elect Trump—"and a decision to authorize you to be a 'special representative' and manage this process." Kilimnik assured Manafort, with that authority, he "could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia [Yanukovych] guarantees your reception at the very top level," and that "DT could have peace in Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration."<sup>952</sup>

As noted above, Grand Jury	and statements to the Office, Manafort sought to
qualify his engagement on and support for the p	lan. Grand Jury
53 Grand Jury	개통 선생님의 영국 그 가격 독대 방송한 것 그는 것 같아요.
<sup>54</sup> Grand Jury	
	<sup>955</sup> Grand Jury
방법 문화가 여행을 받는 것이 많은 것이 많을 것이다.	

On February 26, 2017, Manafort met Kilimnik in Madrid, where Kilimnik had flown from Moscow.<sup>956</sup> In his first two interviews with the Office, Manafort denied meeting with Kilimnik on his Madrid trip and then—after being confronted with documentary evidence that Kilimnik was in Madrid at the same time as him—recognized that he met him in Madrid. Manafort said that Kilimnik had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called "black ledger" payments to Manafort that was being conducted by Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau.<sup>957</sup>

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Manafort remained in contact with Kilimnik throughout 2017 and into the spring of 2018.

<sup>951</sup> Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6; Grand Jury	States - States - States
952 Investigative Technique	
953 Grand Jury	
<sup>954</sup> Grand Jury	
<sup>955</sup> Grand Jury	
<sup>956</sup> 2/21/17 Email, Zatynaiko to Kilimnik.	
<sup>957</sup> Manafort 9/13/18 302, at 1.	
958 Grand Jury	In resolving whether Manafort breached

his cooperation plea agreement by lying to the Office, the district court found that Manafort lied about, among other things, his contacts with Kilimnik regarding the peace plan, including the meeting in Madrid. *Manafort* 2/13/19 Transcript, at 29-31, 40.

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Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the Office,<sup>959</sup> and the Ukraine peace plan. In early 2018, Manafort retained his longtime polling firm to craft a draft poll in Ukraine, sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent by Kilimnik, and worked with Kilimnik to formulate the polling questions.<sup>960</sup> The primer sent to the pollsters specifically called for the United States and President Trump to support the Autonomous Republic of Donbas with Yanukovych as Prime Minister,<sup>961</sup> and a series of questions in the draft poll asked for opinions on Yanukovych's role in resolving the conflict in Donbas.<sup>962</sup> (The poll was not solely about Donbas; it also sought participants' views on leaders apart from Yanukovych as they pertained to the 2019 Ukraine presidential election.)

The Office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace plan to the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration. Kilimnik continued his efforts to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch (*e.g.*, U.S. Department of State) into the summer of 2018.<sup>963</sup>

#### **B.** Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts

Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Beginning immediately after the election, individuals connected to the Russian government started contacting officials on the Trump Campaign and Transition Team through multiple channels—sometimes through Russian Ambassador Kislyak and at other times through individuals who sought reliable contacts through U.S. persons not formally tied to the Campaign or Transition Team. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The investigation did not establish that these efforts reflected or constituted coordination between the Trump Campaign and Russia in its election-interference activities.

#### 1. Immediate Post-Election Activity

As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected President, Russian government officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new Administration. They appeared not to have preexisting contacts and struggled to connect with senior officials around the President-Elect. As explained below, those efforts entailed both official contact through the Russian Embassy in the United States and outreaches—sanctioned at high levels of the Russian government—through business rather than political contacts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>959</sup> Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, at 2; Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 48-51, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018), Doc. 318.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>960</sup> 2/12/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort & Ward; 2/16/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort; 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward; 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>961</sup> 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio (7:16:49 a.m.) (attachment).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>962</sup> 3/9/18 Email, Ward to Manafort & Fabrizio (attachment).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>963</sup> Investigative Technique

#### a. Outreach from the Russian Government

At approximately 3 a.m. on election night, Trump Campaign press secretary Hope Hicks received a telephone call on her personal cell phone from a person who sounded foreign but was calling from a number with a DC area code.<sup>964</sup> Although Hicks had a hard time understanding the person, she could make out the words "Putin call."<sup>965</sup> Hicks told the caller to send her an email.<sup>966</sup>

The following morning, on November 9, 2016, Sergey Kuznetsov, an official at the Russian Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks from his Gmail address with the subject line, "Message from Putin."<sup>967</sup> Attached to the email was a message from Putin, in both English and Russian, which Kuznetsov asked Hicks to convey to the President-Elect.<sup>968</sup> In the message, Putin offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he "look[ed] forward to working with [Trump] on leading Russian-American relations out of crisis."<sup>969</sup>

Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner, asking, "Can you look into this? Don't want to get duped but don't want to blow off Putin!"<sup>970</sup> Kushner stated in Congressional testimony that he believed that it would be possible to verify the authenticity of the forwarded email through the Russian Ambassador, whom Kushner had previously met in April 2016.<sup>971</sup> Unable to recall the Russian Ambassador's name, Kushner emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI, whom he had consulted previously about Russia, *see* Volume I, Section IV.A.4, *supra*, and asked, "What is the name of Russian ambassador?"<sup>972</sup> Kushner forwarded Simes's response—which identified Kislyak by name—to Hicks.<sup>973</sup> After checking with Kushner to see what he had learned, Hicks conveyed Putin's letter to transition officials.<sup>974</sup> Five days later, on November 14, 2016, Trump and Putin spoke by phone in the presence of Transition Team members, including incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn.<sup>975</sup>

964 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3.

<sup>965</sup> Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3.

<sup>966</sup> Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3.

<sup>967</sup> NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.)).

968 NOSC00044381-82 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.)).

<sup>969</sup> NOSC00044382 (11/9/16 Letter from Putin to President-Elect Trump (Nov. 9, 2016) (translation)).

970 NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Hicks to Kushner (10:26 a.m.)).

<sup>971</sup> Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017).

<sup>972</sup> NOSC00000058 (11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (10:28 a.m.)); Statement of Jared Kushner to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017).

<sup>973</sup> NOSC00000058 (11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Hicks (11:05:44 a.m.)).

974 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3-4.

<sup>975</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-10; see Doug G. Ware, Trump, Russia's Putin Talk about Syria, Icy Relations in Phone Call, UPI (Nov. 14, 2016).

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#### b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels

As Russian officials in the United States reached out to the President-Elect and his team, a number of Russian individuals working in the private sector began their own efforts to make contact. Petr Aven, a Russian national who heads Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest commercial bank, described to the Office interactions with Putin during this time period that might account for the flurry of Russian activity.<sup>976</sup>

Aven told the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin; these 50 men are often referred to as "oligarchs."<sup>977</sup> Aven told the Office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin, including in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2016, shortly after the U.S. presidential election.<sup>978</sup> Aven said that he took these meetings seriously and understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin made during these meetings were implicit directives, and that there would be consequences for Aven if he did not follow through.<sup>979</sup> As was typical, the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting with Putin's chief of staff, Anton Vaino.<sup>980</sup>

According to Aven, at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin,<sup>981</sup> Putin raised the prospect that the United States would impose additional sanctions on Russian interests, including sanctions against Aven and/or Alfa-Bank.<sup>982</sup> Putin suggested that Aven needed to take steps to protect himself and Alfa-Bank.<sup>983</sup> Aven also testified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by the Russian government in getting in touch with the incoming Trump Administration.<sup>984</sup> According to Aven, Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and generally did not know the people around the President-Elect.<sup>985</sup>

<sup>976</sup> Aven provided information to the Office in an interview and through an attorney proffer, **Grand Jury** 

- 977 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.
- <sup>78</sup> Grand Jury
- 979 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 2-3.

<sup>980</sup> **Grand Jury** and interview with the Office, Aven referred to the high-ranking Russian government officials using numbers (*e.g.*, Official 1, Official 2). Aven separately confirmed through an attorney proffer that Official 1 was Putin and Official 2 was Putin's chief of staff, Vaino. *See* Affidavit of Ryan Junck (Aug. 2, 2018) (hard copy on file).

<sup>981</sup> At the time of his Q4 2016 meeting with Putin, Aven was generally aware of the press coverage about Russian interference in the U.S. election. According to Aven, he did not discuss that topic with Putin at any point, and Putin did not mention the rationale behind the threat of new sanctions. Aven 8/2/18 302, at 5-7.



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Aven **Grand Jury** told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alfa-Bank shareholders from potential sanctions, and one of those steps would be to try to reach out to the incoming Administration to establish a line of communication.<sup>986</sup> Aven described Putin responding with skepticism about Aven's prospect for success.<sup>987</sup> According to Aven, although Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team, Aven understood that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised.<sup>988</sup> Aven's efforts are described in Volume I, Section IV.B.5, *infra*.

#### 2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration

Aven's description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behavior of Kirill Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign wealth fund and is closely connected to Putin. Dmitriev undertook efforts to meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in the months after the election. Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trump transition officials, and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitriev and Erik Prince, a Trump Campaign supporter and an associate of Steve Bannon.<sup>989</sup> In addition, the UAE national security advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner, Rick Gerson, in late November 2016. In December 2016 and January 2017, Dmitriev and Gerson worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied he cleared through Putin. Gerson provided that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

#### a. Background

Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), when it was founded in 2011.<sup>990</sup> Dmitriev reported directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his "boss."<sup>991</sup>

RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds.<sup>992</sup> Dmitriev regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed

986 Grand Jury	
987 Grand Jury	Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6.
<sup>988</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 4-8	Grand Jury

<sup>990</sup> Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, *available at* https://rdif.ru/Eng\_person\_dmitriev\_kirill/. *See also* Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund, *available at* https://rdif.ru/Eng About/.

<sup>991</sup> Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. See also, e.g., 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.

<sup>992</sup> Grand Jury

(Crown Prince Mohammed), in connection with RDIF's dealings with the UAE.<sup>993</sup> Putin wanted Dmitriev to be in charge of both the financial and the political relationship between Russia and the Gulf states, in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and spoke English fluently.<sup>994</sup> Nader considered Dmitriev to be Putin's interlocutor in the Gulf region, and would relay Dmitriev's views directly to Crown Prince Mohammed.<sup>995</sup>

Nader developed contacts with both U.S. presidential campaigns during the 2016 election, and kept Dmitriev abreast of his efforts to do so.<sup>996</sup> According to Nader, Dmitriev said that his and the government of Russia's preference was for candidate Trump to win, and asked Nader to assist him in meeting members of the Trump Campaign.<sup>997</sup> Grand Jury

<sup>8</sup> Nader did not

introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the Trump Campaign before the election.999



Erik Prince is a businessman who had relationships with various individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, including Steve Bannon, Donald Trump Jr., and Roger Stone.<sup>1005</sup> Prince did not have a formal role in the Campaign, although he offered to host a fundraiser for

993 Nader	1/22/18 302, at 1-2;	Nader 1/23/18 3	02, at 2-3; 5/	3/16 Email,	Nader to	Phares;
Grand Jury	15.10大学习					
994 Nader	1/22/18 302, at 1-2.					
995 Nader	1/22/18 302, at 3.					
996 Nader	1/22/18 302, at 3; Gra	and Jury		Carle Carle		
997 Nader	1/22/18 302, at 3; Gra	and Jury				
<sup>998</sup> Gran	d Jury					
999 Nader	1/22/18 302, at 3.					
<sup>1000</sup> Gran	nd Jury					
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<sup>1002</sup> Gran	nd Jury	Alter and				
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<sup>1004</sup> Gran	nd Jury	Terostal Sector				

<sup>1005</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1-5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21.

Trump and sent unsolicited policy papers on issues such as foreign policy, trade, and Russian election interference to Bannon.<sup>1006</sup>

After the election, Prince frequently visited transition offices at Trump Tower, primarily to meet with Bannon but on occasion to meet Michael Flynn and others.<sup>1007</sup> Prince and Bannon would discuss, *inter alia*, foreign policy issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who should be appointed to fill key national security positions.<sup>1008</sup> Although Prince was not formally affiliated with the transition, Nader **Grand Jury** received assurances **Grand Jury** that the incoming Administration considered Prince a trusted associate.<sup>1009</sup>

b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration

Soon after midnight on election night, Dmitriev messaged Investigative Technique who was traveling to New York to attend the 2016 World Chess Championship. Investigative Technique Dmitry Peskov, the Russian Federation's press secretary, who was also attending the World Chess Championship.<sup>1010</sup> Investigative Technique 1011 Investigative Technique

At approximately 2:40 a.m. on November 9, 2016, news reports stated that candidate Clinton had called President-Elect Trump to concede. At Investigative Technique

1014 Investigative Technique

wrote to Dmitriev, "Putin has won."<sup>101</sup>

<sup>1006</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1, 3-4; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 19-20; 10/18/16 Email, Prince to Bannon.

<sup>1007</sup> Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 6; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 5; Flynn 1/24/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 11; Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5, 8; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 20-21; 11/12/16 Email, Prince to Corallo.

<sup>1008</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21.	
1009 Grand Jury	
<sup>1010</sup> Investigative Technique	Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6;
Grand Jury	
<sup>1011</sup> Investigative Technique	
<sup>1012</sup> Investigative Technique	
<sup>1013</sup> Investigative Technique	
<sup>1014</sup> Investigative Technique	
<sup>1015</sup> Investigative Technique	

Later that morning, Dmitriev contacted Nader, who was in New York, to request a meeting with the "key people" in the incoming Administration as soon as possible in light of the "[g]reat results."<sup>1016</sup> He asked Nader to convey to the incoming Administration that "we want to start rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them. We understand all of the sensitivities and are not in a rush."<sup>1017</sup> Dmitriev and Nader had previously discussed Nader introducing him to the contacts Nader had made within the Trump Campaign.<sup>1018</sup> Dmitriev also told Nader that he would ask Putin for permission to travel to the United States, where he would be able to speak to media outlets about the positive impact of Trump's election and the need for reconciliation between the United States and Russia.<sup>1019</sup>

Later that day, Dmitriev flew to New York, where Peskov was separately traveling to attend the chess tournament.<sup>1020</sup> Dmitriev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and noted that, if there was "a chance to see anyone key from Trump camp," he "would love to start building for the future."<sup>1021</sup> Dmitriev also asked Nader to invite Kushner to the event so that he (Dmitriev) could meet him.<sup>1022</sup> Nader did not pass along Dmitriev's invitation to anyone connected with the incoming Administration.<sup>1023</sup> Although one World Chess Federation official recalled hearing from an attendee that President-Elect Trump had stopped by the tournament, the investigation did not establish that Trump or any Campaign or Transition Team official attended the event.<sup>1024</sup> And the President's written answers denied that he had.<sup>1025</sup>

Nader stated that Dmitriev continued to press him to set up a meeting with transition officials, and was particularly focused on Kushner and Trump Jr.<sup>1026</sup> Dmitriev told Nader that Putin would be very grateful to Nader and that a meeting would make history.<sup>1027</sup>

Grand Jury

<sup>1016</sup> 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (9:34 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 4.

<sup>1017</sup> 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:58 p.m.).

<sup>1018</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3.

<sup>1019</sup> 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:06 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:10 a.m.); Grand Jury

<sup>1020</sup> 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:08 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (3:40 p.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5.

<sup>1021</sup> 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (7:10 p.m.).

<sup>1022</sup> 11/10/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (5:20 a.m.).

<sup>1023</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6.

<sup>1024</sup> Marinello 5/31/18 302, at 2-3; Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6.

<sup>1025</sup> Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17-18 (Response to Question V, Part (a).

<sup>1026</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6; Grand Jury

<sup>1027</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6; Grand Jury

<sup>1028</sup> Grand Jury

<sup>029</sup> According to Nader, Dmitriev was very

anxious to connect with the incoming Administration and told Nader that he would try other routes to do so besides Nader himself.<sup>1030</sup> Nader did not ultimately introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the incoming Administration during Dmitriev's post-election trip to New York.<sup>1031</sup>

In early December 2016, Dmitriev again broached the topic of meeting incoming Administration officials with Nader in January or February.<sup>1032</sup> Dmitriev sent Nader a list of publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speaking positively about Donald Trump "in case they [were] helpful.<sup>\*1033</sup>

#### c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles

## i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev

Nader traveled to New York in early January 2017 and had lunchtime and dinner meetings with Erik Prince on January 3, 2017.<sup>1034</sup> Nader and Prince discussed Dmitriev.<sup>1035</sup> Nader informed Prince that the Russians were looking to build a link with the incoming Trump Administration.<sup>1036</sup> **Grand Jury** he told Prince that Dmitriev had been pushing Nader to introduce him to someone from the incoming Administration **Grand Jury** .<sup>1037</sup> Nader suggested, in light of Prince's relationship with Transition Team officials, that Prince and Dmitriev meet to discuss issues of mutual concern.<sup>1038</sup> **Grand Jury** Prince told Nader that he needed to think further about it and to check with Transition Team officials.<sup>1039</sup>

After his dinner with Prince, Nader sent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev, and sent Dmitriev a message stating that he had just met "with some key people within the family and inner circle"—a reference to Prince—and that he had spoken at length and positively about

<sup>1028</sup> Grand Jury	
<sup>1029</sup> Grand Jury	

<sup>1030</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6.

<sup>1031</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-7.

<sup>1032</sup> 12/8/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:31 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 11.

<sup>1033</sup> 12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:31 a.m.); 12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:57 a.m.).



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Dmitriev.<sup>1040</sup> Nader told Dmitriev that the people he met had asked for Dmitriev's bio, and Dmitriev replied that he would update and send it.<sup>1041</sup> Nader later received from Dmitriev two files concerning Dmitriev: one was a two-page biography, and the other was a list of Dmitriev's positive quotes about Donald Trump.<sup>1042</sup>

The next morning, Nader forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him to Prince.<sup>1043</sup> Nader wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions "to be used with some additional details for them" (with "them" referring to members of the incoming Administration).<sup>1044</sup> Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour of receiving them.<sup>1045</sup> Prince stated that, while he was at Trump Tower that day, he spoke with Kellyanne Conway, Wilbur Ross, Steve Mnuchin, and others while waiting to see Bannon.<sup>1046</sup> Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone indicates that Prince remained at Trump Tower for approximately three hours.<sup>1047</sup> Prince said that he could not recall whether, during those three hours, he met with Bannon and discussed Dmitriev with him.<sup>1048</sup> Grand Jury

Prince booked a ticket to the Seychelles on January 7, 2017.<sup>1050</sup> The following day, Nader wrote to Dmitriev that he had a "pleasant surprise" for him, namely that he had arranged for Dmitriev to meet "a Special Guest" from "the New Team," referring to Prince.<sup>1051</sup> Nader asked Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on January 12, 2017, and Dmitriev agreed.<sup>1052</sup>

The following day, Dmitriev sought assurance from Nader that the Seychelles meeting would be worthwhile.<sup>1053</sup> Grand Jury Dmitriev was not enthusiastic about the idea of meeting with Prince, and that Nader assured him that Prince wielded influence with the incoming

<sup>1040</sup> 1/4/17 Text Message, Nader to Prince; 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (5:24 a.m. – 5:26 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 8-9; **Grand Jury** 

<sup>1041</sup> 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (7:24:27 a.m.).

<sup>1042</sup> 1/4/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (7:25-7:29 a.m.)

<sup>1043</sup> 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince.

<sup>1044</sup> 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince; Grand Jury

<sup>1045</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 1-3.

<sup>1046</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2-3.

<sup>1047</sup> Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone **Investigative Technique** 

<sup>1048</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3.

<sup>1049</sup> Grand Jury

<sup>1050</sup> 1/5/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince.

<sup>1051</sup> 1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (6:05 – 6:10 p.m.).

<sup>1052</sup> 1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (6:10 – 7:27 p.m.).

<sup>1053</sup> 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader.